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ARTICLE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT OF
PUBLIC DISCOURSE: OUTRAGEOUS OPINION,
DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION, AND
HUSTLER MAGAZINE V. FALWELL
Robert C. Post*
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell is the most recent in a long line of first
amendment decisions in which the Supreme Court has extended constitu-
tional protection to outrageous or offensive speech. In this article Professor
Post analyzes the theory behind this protection. He argues that speech is
defined as outrageous by reference to norms of community life. In the
culturally heterogeneous environment of the United States, however, first
amendment doctrine functions to facilitate communication among commu-
nities, so that a common democratic and public opinion may be formed. For
this reason first amendment doctrine demarcates a distinct realm of public
discourse that is neutral with respect to the norms of specific communities.
Professor Post demonstrates how several important themes in the Falwell
opinion follow from this separation of public discourse from community
values. In particular he contends that the separation illuminates Falwell's
rejection of "outrageousness" and "bad motive" as criteria for the regulation
of public discourse, as well as its reliance upon the curious and muddy
distinction between fact and opinion. Professor Post notes, however, that
the constitutional concept of public discourse is inherently unstable, because
speech that violates community norms of civility is perceived as irrational
and coercive, and hence as incompatible with public deliberation. Thus first
amendment doctrine suspends legal enforcement of the very norms that make
rational deliberation possible. Professor Post labels this the "paradox of
public discourse," and argues that the paradox accounts for the jagged and
uneven course of first amendment doctrine. The article concludes with a
discussion of the various methods by which the domain of public discourse
may be defined.
T HE recent "revival" of the view that politics should be understood
as a "deliberative process"' raises significant questions for first
amendment jurisprudence. It invites reconsideration of the function
* Professor of Law, School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California at Berkeley. This
paper has improved immeasurably from the comments and insights of others. I would especially
like to thank T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Edwin Baker, Mel Eisenberg, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein,
Marc Franklin, Kenneth Karst, Seth Kreimer, Sheldon Messinger, Paul Mishkin, Hanna Pitkin,
Terrance Sandalow, Ferdinand Schoeman, Philip Selznick, Jerome Skolnick, Rodney Smolla,
Bernard Williams, the participants of the Columbia Legal Theory Workshop, and the partici-
pants of the Michigan Legal and Political Theory Workshop.
I Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541 (i988).
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and extent of constitutional protection for public speech. Professor
Frank Michelman, an astute participant in the revival, has for ex-
ample convincingly argued that public deliberation cannot achieve its
purposes if it is "considered or experienced as coercive, or invasive,
or otherwise a violation of one's identity or freedom."'2
Although the United States Supreme Court has increasingly fash-
ioned first amendment doctrine around the concept of what it calls
"public discourse," 3 it has developed the concept in ways that seem
plainly incompatible with Michelman's point. Emblematic is the
Court's 1988 opinion in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist used the notion of "public discourse" constitutionally
to immunize from legal regulation speech that was justifiably experi-
enced as profoundly invasive and violative of identity.4 During
the last two Terms the Court has explicitly and forcefully reiterated
this approach: "in public debate our own citizens must tolerate
insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide 'ade-
quate "breathing space" to the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment.'"s
The purpose of this Article is to assess the justification and struc-
ture of the concept of public discourse that underlies these strong
conclusions. It uses the Falwell decision as a specific focus for anal-
ysis. Part I appraises torts like defamation and the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, which form the basis of the Falwell case,
and illustrates how they regulate communication in order authorita-
tively to enforce a particular kind of community life. The first amend-
ment doctrines invoked by Falwell prohibit this enforcement within
the realm of public discourse. Part II then explores the theory of
public discourse that justifies this prohibition. That theory, in brief,
turns on the demarcation of a distinct realm of speech within which
legal application of the ordinary norms of community life is consti-
tutionally suspended. This suspension ensures that in the culturally
heterogeneous environment of the United States, public debate can
proceed within an arena that is legally neutral with respect to the
norms of particular communities. It also creates an arena within
which new forms of community life can be exemplified and advocated.
But the suspension is conceptually and socially unstable, because
speech that contravenes community norms is experienced as coercive
2 Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1527 (1988).
3 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, xo8 S. Ct. 876, 881 (1988); Bethel School Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1986); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (i985).
4 See Falwell, io8 S. Ct. at 880-82.
5 Boos v. Barry, 1o8 S. Ct. 1157, 1164 (1988) (quoting Falwell, xo8 S. Ct. at 882); see also
Texas v. Johnson, io9 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (1989) (holding mere offensiveness insufficient to justify
suppression of speech).
[Vol. 1o3:6Oi
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and violative of personal identity, and hence as incompatible with
constructive public debate.
Part III demonstrates how the first amendment doctrines employed
by the Falwell opinion follow from its conception of public discourse.
The constitutional separation of public discourse from community life
illuminates why Falwell rejects "outrageousness" and illicit motivation
as grounds for the regulation of public speech. 6 It also explains why
Falwell turns on the curious and muddy distinction between fact and
opinion, 7 for the Article argues that statements of fact are those which
claim to be true regardless of the standards that define community
life, whereas statements of opinion are those which claim to be true
on the basis of the standards of a particular community.
Finally, Part IV canvasses the various criteria used by the Court
to distinguish public discourse from other speech. These criteria are
generally conceded to be inadequate, and Part IV explores the reasons
for this failure. It then offers a reconceptualization of these criteria
that attempts more fully to uncover the values at issue in the classi-
fication of speech as public discourse.
I. HUSTLER MAGAZINE V. FALWELL
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell is a classic first amendment case.8
Its antagonists could have been selected by central casting to embody
the fundamental constitutional tension between anarchic self-expres-
sion and strict civic virtue. The plaintiff was Jerry Falwell, a well-
known religious fundamentalist and leader of the Moral Majority, a
political organization that sought to inject traditional values into
American public life. The defendants were Hustler Magazine and its
publisher, Larry Flynt, both notorious for their dedication to a vivid
and perverse pornography. The subject of the dispute was a vicious
and puerile satire that purported to describe an incestuous encounter
between Falwell and his mother in an outhouse, and that was in-
tended, as Flynt testified, to "assassinate" Falwell's integrity. 9
Michael Sandel once observed that "[l]iberals often take pride in
defending what they oppose."' 0 If that is true, there was much to be
proud of in the Falwell opinion. Even those who maintained that the
6 See Falwell, io8 S. Ct. at 880-82.
7 See id. at 88o, 882.
8 The Falwell decision has been called "momentous," "a case of profound first amendment
significance." Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v.
Falwell, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 423, 442 (1988). For the background of the case, see R. SMOLLA,
JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL (2988).
9 Deposition Testimony of Larry Flynt, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 91, 141, Falwell (No.
86-1278).
10 Sandel, Morality and the Liberal Ideal, NEw REPUBLIC, May 7, 1984, at 15.
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Hustler parody was constitutionally protected confessed to the "pro-
found repugnance" that it inspired." In the face of that repugnance,
however, the Supreme Court, impressively massing behind an opinion
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held in ringing first amendment tones that
however "outrageous" the satire, however maliciously motivated or
intensely painful its effects, a public figure like Falwell could not
recover damages without demonstrating the existence of "a false state-
ment of fact which was made with 'actual malice." 1 2 The Falwell
opinion thus stands squarely in the tradition of Cohen v. California1 3
as an important articulation of the first amendment right to give
offense.
A. The Background of the Case
The antagonism between Larry Flynt and Jerry Falwell could
hardly be more natural. Flynt was to Falwell a "sleaze merchant, ' 14
a purveyor of precisely the kind of moral corruption that Falwell
sought to destroy. Falwell was to Flynt a phony, "a big windbag"
who, like the fallen evangelists Jimmy Swaggart and Jim Bakker,
needed to be "exposed.' 5 For years Flynt had excoriated Falwell in
the pages of Hustler, the raunchy flagship of Flynt's pornographic
publications, as a "vicious hypocrite."1 6 The breaking point came in
November 1983, when Hustler featured on its inside front cover a
parody of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur. Campari ads had
a well-known and recognizable format. They featured celebrities
speaking about their "first time," meaning their first drink of Campari,
but with a clear double entendre concerning their first sexual experi-
ence.
Hustler's version was entitled "Jerry Falwell talks about his first
time."1 7 The spoof followed the usual Campari format; it featured a
11 Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
12 Falwell, 1O8 S. Ct. at 882.
13 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
14 See Taylor, Court, 8-o, Extends Right To Criticize Those in Public Eye, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 25, 1988, at A22, col. 2.
Is See Savage, Justices Void Award Falwell Won from Flynt, L.A. Times, Feb. 25, 1988,
pt. i, at 23, col. I.
16 See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit ii (excerpting Feb. 198o issue of Hustler Magazine), reprinted
in Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 209. In February 198o, Hustler had named Falwell its
"Asshole of the Month." Id. See generally Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 1I-15 (excerpting Feb.
i98o, Nov. i981, Dec. 1981, Feb. 1982, and Mar. 1983 issues of Hustler Magazine) (character-
izing Falwell as a fanatic, a charlatan and an egomaniac, and envisioning censorship and
destruction of classic works of art under a Moral Majority regime), reprinted in Joint Appendix,
supra note 9, at 208-24.
17 Hustler, Nov. 1983, reprinted in On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
[Vol. 1o3:6oi
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thoughtful photograph of Falwell, beneath which was set forth the
following "interview":
FALWELL: My first time was in an outhouse outside Lynchburg,
Virginia.
INTERVIEWER: Wasn't it a little cramped?
FALWELL: Not after I kicked the goat out.
INTERVIEWER: I see. You must tell me all about it.
FALWELL: I never really expected to make it with Mom, but then
after she showed all the other guys in town such a good time, I
figured, "What the hell!"
INTERVIEWER: But your mom? Isn't that a bit odd?
FALWELL: I don't think so. Looks don't mean that much to me in
a woman.
INTERVIEWER: Go on.
FALWELL: Well, we were drunk off our God-fearing asses on Cam-
pari, ginger ale and soda - that's called a Fire and Brimstone - at
the time. And Mom looked better than a Baptist whore with a $ioo
donation.
INTERVIEWER: Campari in the crapper with Mom... how inter-
esting. Well, how was it?
FALWELL: The Campari was great, but Mom passed out before I
could come.
INTERVIEWER: Did you ever try it again?
FALWELL: Sure... lots of times. But not in the outhouse. Between
Mom and the shit, the flies were too much to bear.
INTERVIEWER: We meant the Campari.
FALWELL: Oh, yeah. I always get sloshed before I go out to the
pulpit. You don't think I could lay down all that bullshit sober, do
you?18
At the bottom of the parody, in small letters, was the disclaimer "ad
parody - not to be taken seriously."' 19
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit at El, Falwell (No. 86-1278) [hereinafter Petition for
Writ of Certiorari].
18 Id.
19 Id. Hustler's table of contents listed the satire as "Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody."
xo8 S. Ct. at 878.
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Falwell was not amused. In fact he was "incensed."20 He first
read the parody on an airplane; when his flight landed he called his
lawyer and said, "Get him."21 Falwell wanted "'to protect myself and
the memory of my mother,' and to end 'the kind of sleaze merchantry
that Larry Flynt typifies.' ' 22 Almost immediately thereafter he filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia, alleging defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 23
Falwell's legal strategy reflected the growing trend of plaintiffs to
combine in a single complaint two or more of the three so-called
"dignitary torts or torts which focus on the protection of 'personal-
ity.' 24 The strategy proved fortunate for Falwell. Because Virginia
had no common law cause of action for invasion of privacy,25 Falwell
was forced to base his privacy claim on a Virginia statute prohibiting
the use of a person's name or likeness for purposes of trade or adver-
tising without his consent.2 6 At the close of evidence, however, the
district court ruled as a matter of law that Flynt's use of "Falwell's
20 See Taylor, Sharp Words in High Court on Hustler Parody of Falwell, N.Y. Times, Dec.
3, 1987, at A30, col i.
21 Id.
22 Id. (quoting Jerry Falwell).
23 See io8 S. Ct. at 878. Jurisdiction was established on the basis of diversity. The suit
named as defendants Larry Flynt, Hustler Magazine, Inc., and Flynt Distributing Co., Inc.
See Complaint, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 4-5.
On November i5, 1983, Falwell sent out two mailings to solicit contributions "to help...
defend his mother's memory in court." Hustler Magazine v. Moral Majority, 796 F.2d 1148,
1150 (9th Cir. 1986). The first mailing, which was sent to approximately 500,000 "'rank-and-
file members'" of the Moral Majority, described the Hustler parody; the second, which was sent
to about 26,900 "'major donors,'" included a copy of the parody with eight words blackened
out. See id. On November 18, Falwell solicited contributions from about 750,000 supporters
of the Old Time Gospel Hour. In his mailing he included a copy of the parody and a letter
"focused on the need to keep Fawell's religious television stations open in order to combat
people like Larry Flynt." Id. These solicitations produced in excess of $700,000 in contributions.
See id. On December 4 and December ii, Faiwell also displayed the parody during a sermon
broadcast nationwide on the Old Time Gospel Hour. See id. Flynt retaliated by reprinting the
parody in the March 1984 issue of Hustler, see id. at 1149, and by suing Falwell for copyright
infringement because of Faiwell's use of the parody to solicit contributions. See id. at 1150.
The Ninth Circuit, however, held the mailings and the television displays permissible under the
fair use doctrine. See id. at 1r51-56.
24 Mead, Suing Media for Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method Analysis of Tort Law Evo-
lution, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 24, 29, 43 (1983).
25 See Brown v. ABC, 704 F.2d 1296, 1302-03 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying Virginia law).
26 See Complaint, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at i6. Faiwell's complaint
relied on VA. CODE ANN. § 8.oI-4o (1984), which provides, in part:
Any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used without having first obtained the
written consent of such person ... for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade
: ..may maintain a suit in equity ... and may also sue and recover damages for any
injuries sustained by reason of such use.
[Vol. IO3:6oi
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name and likeness . . . was not for purposes of trade within the
meaning of the statute. '2 7 Falwell's libel claim was also eliminated
when the jury returned a special verdict that the Hustler parody could
not "reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about plaintiff
or actual events in which plaintiff participated. "28  Since 1974 it has
been assumed that dictum in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.2 9 establishes
an absolute constitutional privilege in defamation actions for the pub-
lication of opinion, as opposed to false fact, 30 and the jury's verdict
was taken to mean that the Campari parody was opinion. 31
All that remained, therefore, was Falwell's claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Virginia law specifies that in order to
succeed a plaintiff must establish four elements:
One, the wrongdoer's conduct was intentional or reckless. This ele-
ment is satisfied where the wrongdoer had the specific purpose of
inflicting emotional distress or where he intended his specific conduct
and knew or should have known that emotional distress would likely
result. Two, the conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it
offends against the generally accepted standards of decency and mo-
rality. This requirement is aimed at limiting frivolous suits and avoid-
ing litigation in situations where only bad manners and mere hurt
feelings are involved. Three, there was a causal connection between
the wrongdoer's conduct and the emotional distress. Four, the emo-
tional distress was severe.32
Falwell's evidence that Flynt had intended to cause him distress rested
on Flynt's deposition testimony that he had intended to "upset" Fal-
well, 33 that he had wanted "[t]o settle a score" because Falwell had
27 Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986). The Fourth Circuit, upholding the
ruling, relied primarily on interpretations of § 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, to which
it found the Virginia statute "substantially similar." See id. at 1278; N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW
§ 5I (McKinney Supp. z989).
28 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at Ci.
29 418 U.S. 323 (i974).
30 See id. at 339-4o. For a brief survey of the impact of the Gertz dictum, see Gleason,
The Fact/Opinion Distinction, in Libel, io HASTINGS CoMMIENT L.J. 763, 775-92 (I988).
31 See Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1275-76.
32 Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (I974), cited in Falwell, 797
F.2d at 1275 n.4.
33 See Deposition Testimony of Larry Flynt, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at
136. Flynt was obviously irrational and deeply disturbed during his deposition. He began the
deposition by identifying himself as "Christopher Columbus Cornwallis I.P.Q. Harvey H.
Apache Pugh." Id. at 9i. He repeatedly directed uncontrolled and foul-mouthed remarks to
the attorneys in the room, calling his own lawyer an "idiot," see id. at 99, and a "liar," see id.
at 144, and telling him to "shut up," see id. at m19. He called Falwell's lawyer an "asshole."
See id. at 93-95. Flynt claimed that his life was "in danger," see id. at 146, that he had a
photograph of Falwell having coitus with a sheep, see id. at 124, that he had affidavits of
persons who had seen Falwell committing incest with his mother, see id. at io5, and that the
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labelled Flynt's personal life "abominable," 34 and that he had desired
to "assassinate" Falwell's integrity.35 Falwell's evidence that the Hus-
tler parody had caused severe emotional distress consisted primarily
of his testimony that reading the satire had inflicted a "very deep
wound of personal anguish and hurt and suffering, such as nothing
in my adult life I ever recall before." 36 This evidence satisfied the
jury, which, sharing Falwell's opinion that the parody was "outrageous
and intolerable," awarded Falwell $ioo,ooo in compensatory damages,
and held Flynt and Hustler Magazine each responsible for $5o,ooo in
punitive damages. 37
Flynt and Hustler appealed, offering two constitutional argu-
ments. 38 First, they contended that because the Hustler parody was
opinion and constitutionally privileged in a defamation action, it
should also be privileged in a cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 39 Second, they contended that even if the par-
ody were not absolutely privileged, Falwell's admitted status as a
Campari parody was "not intended to parody or exaggerate anything, but to convey the truth,"
id. at 140.
Flynt later moved to have the deposition suppressed on the grounds that he could not
comprehend the obligation of his oath or give a correct account of events, in support of which
he submitted the affidavits of two psychiatrists to the effect that during the deposition Flynt
was in a psychotic, manic state. See Declarations in Support of Defendant's Motion to Exclude
Deposition Testimony of Larry Flynt, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 18o-85.
The trial court initially granted Flynt's motion, but later, on the first day of trial, reversed itself
and admitted an edited version of the deposition into evidence. See Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1273.
34 See Deposition Testimony of Larry Flynt, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at
113.
35 See id. at 141.
36 Testimony of Jerry Falwell, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 38. Falwell
testified:
I have never been to a psychiatrist or psychologist in my life for personal help. I am
not sure but what I feel that as a Christian and a minister - I am not sure it would
not be wrong for me to do it. . . . I did not cut my schedule back; I did not stop
anything I was doing, but I can tell you it has created the most difficult year of
performance, physically, mentally, emotionally, in all of my life. Those who work near
me can tell you that my ability to concentrate and focus on the job at hand has been
greatly, greatly damaged.
Id. at 42. An administrative subordinate of Falwell, Dr. Ron Godwin, testified at trial that
Falwell had an extraordinarily busy schedule, that as a result of the Hustler parody Falwell
neither cut back his schedule in any way nor lost his dynamism in speaking. See Testimony of
Ronald Godwin, reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 52-53. Godwin stated that,
shortly after reading the parody, Falwell seemed "more troubled, more serious, more concerned
than I had ever seen him on any other issue, crisis or otherwise," id. at 53, and that thereafter
it was "more difficult for me as an administrator to get Dr. Falwell's attention and to get him
to be able to focus on the details of the organization we administer," id. at 54.
37 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at C3-C4. The jury returned a verdict
for Flynt Distributing Co., Inc. See id.
38 See Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273-74 (4 th Cir. 1986). Flynt and Hustler also
argued that the trial court had misunderstood some points of state law and that it had issued
a number of incorrect and prejudicial evidentiary rulings. See id. at 1277-78.
39 See id. at 1273-74.
[Vol. Io3:6oi
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public figure meant that "the actual malice standard of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan . . .must be met before Falwell can recover
for emotional distress. '40
The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected both arguments and upheld
the jury's verdict. It brushed aside the first contention on the ground
that the defamation tort was essentially concerned with false state-
ments of fact, whereas an "action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress concerns itself with intentional or reckless conduct which is
outrageous and proximately causes severe emotional distress, not with
statements per se." 41 At issue in the case, therefore, was whether the
defendants' publication was outrageous, not whether the publication
was fact or opinion. Defendants' argument was for this reason "ir-
relevant in the context of this tort."42
The Court of Appeals rejected the second argument on similar
grounds. It noted that although the tort of defamation was intrinsi-
cally concerned with false statements, the "actual malice" standard of
New York Times "alters none of the elements of the tort; it merely
increases the level of fault the plaintiff must prove in order to re-
cover."43 Applying the actual malice standard to the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, on the other hand, "would add a new
element" to the tort and fundamentally shift its focus from the out-
rageous character of a publication to its truth or falsity.44 Interpreting
the New York Times standard as focusing "on culpability, '45 the
Fourth Circuit held that Virginia's requirement that infliction of emo-
tional distress be "intentional or reckless" evidenced an exactly parallel
focus. "The first amendment will not shield intentional or reckless
misconduct resulting in damage to reputation, and neither will it shield
such misconduct which results in severe emotional distress."46
40 Id. at 1273 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). The actual
malice standard of New York Times requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that a defendant has
published the communication at issue with "knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard
of whether it is false or not." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280, quoted in 797 F.2d at 1274
n.2.
41 797 F.2d at 1276.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1275.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 Id. The Fourth Circuit's opinion was instantly controversial, receiving widespread and
largely negative notice. See, e.g., Entin, Privacy, Emotional Distress, and the Limits of Libel
Law Reform, 38 MERCER L. REv. 835, 853-58 (1987); Note, Falwell v. Flynt: First Amendment
Protection of Satirical Speech, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 313, 322-32 (1987); Note, Emotional Distress
When Libel Has Failed: The Faulty Logic of Falwell v. Flynt, i6 COLONIAL LAw. ii5 (1987);
Note, Falwell v. Flynt: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Threat to Free Speech,
8i NWv. U.L. REv. 993, ioo4-o8 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Threat to Free Speech]; Note, Falwell
v. Flynt: An Emerging Threat to Freedom of Speech, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 703, 719-26. But
see Note, Constitutional Law - Satire, Defamation, and the Believability Rule as Bar to
Recovery - Falwell v. Flynt, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 915, 922-29 (1987).
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B. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for
the Court, and his opinion was joined by all Justices except for Justice
Kennedy, who did not participate in the case, and Justice White, who
wrote a short, one paragraph concurrence designed primarily to dis-
associate himself from Chief Justice Rehnquist's strong reaffirmation
of the New York Times actual malice standard. 47 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion is rhetorically adept, touching all the "right" first
amendment sentiments and eloquently evoking the nation's tradition
of cutting political satire. But the argumentative structure of the
opinion is obscure, making it difficult to discern a crisp course of
reasoning.
In essence, however, the logical foundation of the Falwell opinion
lies in its repudiation of the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of New
York Times. The Falwell opinion makes clear that New York Times
was not so much concerned with setting levels of "culpability," as with
fulfilling a constitutional mandate to design rules calculated to facili-
tate "the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest
and concern" that is "[alt the heart of the First Amendment. '48 The
damages assessed against Flynt and Hustler, the Court argued, must
be evaluated against the requirements of that same constitutional
mandate. 49 For this reason it is not sufficient simply to observe, as
did the Fourth Circuit, that the torts of defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress have different functions and elements.
The decisive issue is rather how these elements affect "the world of
debate about public affairs"50 protected by the Constitution.
By a 6-5 vote, the Fourth Circuit denied a petition to rehear the case en banc, see 805 F.2d
484 (4th Cir. 1986), despite a brilliant and stinging dissent by Judge Wilkinson.
47 Justice White had powerfully expressed his dissatisfaction with the New York Times actual
malice standard in his concurring opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 765-74 (I985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Because Chief
Justice Rehnquist had himself previously supported calls for reconsideration of the New York
Times actual malice standard, see Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting & Cable, 476 U.S.
1187, 1i88 (I986) (Burger, C.J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari),
his opinion in Falwell marks a distinct shift toward the conservation of consensus principles of
first amendment jurisprudence developed since New York Times. In assessing the extent of that
shift it should also be noted that Chief Justice Rehnquist had previously questioned the sweeping
constitutionalization of the fact/opinion distinction created by state and federal courts on the
basis of the Gertz dictum. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 471 U.S. 1127, 1129 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 459 U.S. 923, 924-
25 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). A notable achievement of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's Falwell opinion, of course, is its transformation of that dictum into solid
constitutional doctrine.
48 Falwell, io8 S. Ct. at 879.
49 See id. at 879-80.
50 Id. at 88o.
IVol. 1o3:6oi
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The holding of Falwell ultimately rests on three distinct proposi-
tions concerning that world. First, the constitutional value of a com-
munication to "public discourse"5' does not depend upon its motiva-
tion. The American tradition of political cartoonists and satirists, for
example, represents a form of speech "often calculated to injure the
feelings of the subject of the portrayal," and yet "[f]rom the viewpoint
of history it is clear that our political discourse would have been
considerably poorer without" it.5 2 Thus the regulation of improper
intentions, although important for the civil law of torts, is constitu-
tionally inappropriate "in the area of public debate about public fig-
ures.,
53
Second, in the world of public debate safeguarded by the first
amendment, "[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless" be-
cause "they interfere with the truthseeking function of the marketplace
of ideas."'5 4 It is especially important, on the other hand, "to ensure
that individual expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally
imposed sanctions,"55 particularly those opinions or ideas involved in
the criticism of "public men and measures."5 6 That freedom "'is es-
sential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a
whole."''57 The caricature at issue in Falwell should therefore receive
particular constitutional solicitude, not only because it expresses an
idea, but also because it involves the criticism of a public figure.
Third, nonfactual communications in public discourse cannot con-
stitutionally be penalized because of their "outrageousness":
'Outrageousness' in the area of political and social discourse has an
inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose
liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the
basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An 'outrageousness'
standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages
to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse
emotional impact on the audience. 58
While frankly acknowledging that this "refusal" has had its exceptions
as for example with respect to "'fighting' words,"5 9 or to "'vulgar,'
51 See id. at 881.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 88o.
s5 Id. at 879.
56 Id. at 879-8o.
57 Id. at 879 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
503-04 (1984)).
58 Id. at 882.
59 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 3,5 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). For constitutional purposes,
"'fighting' words" are defined as those "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id.
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'offensive,' and 'shocking"' speech broadcast over the electronic
media 60 - the Court in Falwell simply shrugged off this apparent
inconsistency. It casually observed that !"the sort of expression in-
volved in this case does not seem to us to be governed by any
exception to the general First Amendment principles" 61 that "'speech
does not lose its protected character . . . simply because it may
embarrass others"' 62 or because "'society may find [it] offensive."' 63
Each of these three propositions about "the world of debate about
public affairs" is well rooted in traditional constitutional doctrine, and
a good measure of the undeniable power of the Falwell opinion lies
in its ability authentically to evoke such central themes of first amend-
ment jurisprudence. Although the opinion does not even attempt to
explore the logical status and interrelationship of these claims, the
three propositions, when taken together, offer a strongly normative
image of a realm of public discourse that is obviously incompatible
with the jury verdict in Falwell, and that therefore requires the re-
versal of the Fourth Circuit's decision.
In the last two paragraphs of its opinion, the Court in Falwell
shifted gears and announced a narrow prophylactic rule:
[P]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications
such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the
publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with
'actual malice,' i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or
with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.6 4
The Court did not claim that this carefully guarded rule was itself
expressive of the normative characteristics of public discourse. Instead
it proposed the rule as an explicitly instrumental device designed to
ensure that the operation of the legal system not unduly curtail legit-
imate public discussion. The Court justified the rule with the familiar
theory that constitutionally valueless expression must sometimes be
protected so that speakers will not engage in self-censorship and hence
diminish "speech relating to public figures that does have constitu-
tional value. '65 The Court insisted that it had to apply the rule to
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in order "to give
adequate 'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment. "66
60 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978).
61 Falwell, io8 S. Ct. at 882.
62 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982)).
63 Id. (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745).
64 Id. at 882.
65 Id. at 88o.
66 Id. at 882. It should be noted, however, that the Court's proposed rule is as a technical
matter unacceptably casual in its formulation, for it fails to specify any relationship between
[Vol. io3:6oi
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The Falwell opinion thus combines a specific and extraordinarily
narrow holding with reasoning best described as delphic. By refusing
to reconcile inconsistencies between Falwell and prior decisions on
offensive or abusive speech, the opinion fails to address the tension
between such speech and freedom of expression, a tension central to
Falwell and to first amendment jurisprudence generally. The opinion
tells us almost nothing about whether the Constitution protects out-
rageous communications that are privately disseminated rather than
displayed in the pages of a nationally distributed magazine, 67 or
whether it protects outrageous communications that are'designed to
hurt or embarrass private figures, 68 or whether it protects communi-
cations that, although injuring the same emotional tranquility as that
safeguarded by the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
are also violative of similar torts like invasion of privacy.69 If the
only operative legal standard is the "general first amendment principle"
that speech cannot be regulated because it causes offense or embar-
rassment, then these questions are all easily answered: each of these
hypothetical situations is constitutionally indistinguishable from the
one actually presented by the Falwell case.
But this conclusion rings false; it jumps far too easily beyond the
particular circumstances of the Falwell decision. If the implications
the required false fact and the actionable infliction of emotional distress. It does not make clear
whether the false fact must itself cause the consequent emotional distress, or whether the false
fact must merely be "contained" in a publication that otherwise inflicts such distress. If the
latter, the rule does not make clear whether the false fact must be of a certain kind, or whether
any false fact, no matter how innocent, will render an entire publication constitutionally unpro-
tected. It would seem, however, that the rule cannot perform its assigned function of protecting
an area of "breathing space" unless strictly interpreted, that is, unless it were to require that
the false fact stated with actual malice also be intended to and in fact cause intense emotional
distress by reason of its outrageous character.
67 Imagine, for example, that instead of printing the parody in a publication "such as the
one here at issue," id., Flynt had reached Falwell on the telephone and said (with utter malice)
the very same words that he had printed in Hustler. Would Flynt receive the same constitutional
protection?
68 Imagine, for example, that instead of publishing the parody about a public official or a
public figure, Flynt had picked a private person's name at random from the telephone directory
and had published in Hustler the identical Campari parody about him. Would Flynt receive
the same constitutional protection?
69 The holding of Falwell explicitly applies only to actions "for the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress." io8 S. Ct. at 882. But the purpose of the tort of invasion of privacy,
like that of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, is often said to be the provision
of redress for "injury to [a] plaintiff's emotions and his mental suffering." Froelich v. Adair,
213 Kan. 357, 360, Vi6 P.2d 993, 996 (1973); see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384 n.9
(1967). The Court has in fact been deeply troubled by the tension between first amendment
rights and the protection of privacy. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2607-
o9 (1989). Indeed, only four months after Falwell, the Court resolved this tension in a manner
arguably inconsistent with some of the more broadly stated principles contained in Falwell. See
Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (i988).
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of Falwell are not to reach so far, however, the decision must rest on
some implicit constitutional theory considerably more complex than
any announced by the Chief Justice. 70
C. The Significance of the Falwell Opinion: Civility and
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The full significance of the Falwell opinion becomes clear only
when assessed from a historical and functional perspective. The tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress is one of a family of
actions, which include defamation and invasion of privacy, that are
designed to protect the respect to which the law believes persons are
entitled. In serving this function, however, these torts also enforce
those "generally accepted standards of decency and morality"71 that
define for us the meaning of life in a "civilized community. '72 Al-
though our own experience of human dignity subsists in the perfor-
mance of these standards, the Falwell opinion prohibits their enforce-
ment in public discourse, at least in the absence of false statements
of fact.
This prohibition represents a radical departure from the traditional
perspective of the common law. For centuries the kind of ridicule
represented by the Hustler parody was regulated by the common law
tort of defamation. Communications were deemed defamatory if they
exposed an individual "to hatred, contempt, or ridicule." 73 The object
of the tort was the protection of reputation, which is to say the
standing of a person in the eyes of others. But an important reason
why the law protected reputation was, as Justice Stewart observed in
an eloquent and influential formulation, to safeguard "the essential
dignity and worth of every human being." 74
The relationship between dignity and reputation is complex, but
the essential idea is that our sense of identity and "worth" depends to
70 As Rodney Smolla has written, "The intellectual challenge posed by Fawell's suit is not
how to construct a convincing rationale for rejecting his claim, but rather how to articulate
limits on that rationale . . . ." Smolla, supra note 8, at 427; see LeBel, Emotional Distress, the
First Amendment, and "This Kind of Speech": A Heretical Perspective on Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 6o U. COLO. L. REV. 315 (1989).
71 Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 245, 148 (1974).
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1977). For a detailed discussion of
this function in the context of the tort of defamation, see Post, The Social Foundations of
Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 691, 710-19, 732-39
(1986) [hereinafter Post, Foundations of Defamation Law]. For a detailed discussion of this
function in the context of the tort of invasion of privacy, see Post, The Social Foundations of
Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 959-66 (1989)
[hereinafter Post, Foundations of Privacy].
73 Parmiter v. Coupland, 151 Eng. Rep. 340, 342 (Exch. of Pleas 1840).
74 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
[VOL. Io3:6oi
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a significant degree upon what others think of us. 75 Because individ-
ual identity evolves from forms of social interaction, we incorporate
into our personality, into our very sense of self-worth and dignity, the
institutionalized values and norms to which we have been socialized.76
This insight was most acutely formulated by George Herbert Mead,
who observed that "[w]hat goes to make up the organized self is the
organization of the attitudes which are common to the group. A
person is a personality because he belongs to a community, because
he takes over the institutions of that community into his own con-
duct. "77
More recently, the sociologist Erving Goffman has demonstrated
how the very stability of human personality depends upon the contin-
ual reaffirmation of community values and attitudes through the en-
actment of forms of civility, which Goffman calls rules of "deference
and demeanor. s78 In his most famous work, for example, Goffman
documented how certain "total institutions," like mental hospitals,
prisons, or the military, deliberately violate ordinary rules of deference
and demeanor in an attempt to unhinge and alter the identity of new
initiates. 79 This strategy works because a person's "self" can be "dis-
confirm[ed]" if a person is not permitted to participate in the forms of
mutual respect which he has been socialized to expect.8 0 The dignity
and integrity of individual personality thus depend to no small degree
upon the maintenance of this respect.
75 The argument in the following three paragraphs is developed in considerably greater
length in Post, Foundations of Defamation Law, cited above in note 72, at 707-19.
76 See, e.g., A. HALLOWELL, CULTURE AND EXPERIENCE (1955); T. SHIBUTANI, SOCIETY
AND PERSONALITY 239-47 (Ig6I); Caughey, Personal Identity and Social Organization, 8 ETHOS
173 (1980).
77 G. MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY 162 (C. Morris ed. 1937).
78 See E. GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL 47-91 (1967). Rules of deference define conduct
by which a person conveys appreciation "to a recipient of this recipient, or of something of
which this recipient is taken as a symbol, extension, or agent." Id. at 56 (emphasis in original).
Rules of demeanor define conduct by which a person expresses "to those in his immediate
presence that he is a person of certain desirable or undesirable qualities." Id. at 77. Goffman
conceives of these rules as creating a chain of ceremony in which each "individual must rely on
others to complete the picture of him of which he himself is allowed to paint only certain parts."
Id. at 84.
Each individual is responsible for the demeanor image of himself and the deference image
of others, so that for a complete man to be expressed, individuals must hold hands in a
chain of ceremony, each giving deferentially with proper demeanor to the one on the
right what will be received deferentially from the one on the left. While it may be true
that the individual has a unique self all his own, evidence of this possession is thoroughly
a product of joint ceremonial labor, the part expressed through the individual's demeanor
being no more significant than the part conveyed by others through their deferential
behavior toward him.
Id. at 84-85.
79 See E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (I96I).
80 See E. GOFFMAN, supra note 78, at 51.
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Defamatory communications may be defined as those whose con-
tent is not civil, because their meaning violates the respect which we
have come to expect from each other. They thus threaten not only
the self of the defamed person (causing, among other things, symptoms
of "personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering"81), but
also the continued validity of the rules of civility which have been
violated. These rules represent the "special claims which members [of
a community] have on each other, as distinct from others,"82 and
hence they embody the very substance and boundaries of community
life. The definition and enforcement of these boundaries create for
each community "its distinctive shape, its unique identity. '83 The
common law's regulation of defamation contains numerous features
that attempt to preserve the integrity of these rules of civility, and
thus to safeguard not only the dignity and personality of defamed
persons, but also the identity and values of the community. 84
In this process of regulation, the concept of truth played a curious
and ambiguous role. At traditional common law, a libel victim was
given a choice of "two remedies, one by indictment and the other by
action."8 5 If the plaintiff elected to proceed by way of criminal pros-
ecution, the truth or falsity of the libel was deemed immaterial, 86 and
the defendant was "not allowed to alledge [sic] the truth of it by way
of justification. '87 The crime of defamation was thus entirely oriented
toward maintaining the integrity of civility rules. If a plaintiff elected
to bring an action for civil damages, however, a defendant could
plead the "justification" of truth as an affirmative defense. A plaintiff
could not recover compensation if a defendant could prove that his
own uncivil communication was true.
The traditional common law rule had a special twist, however: a
"defamatory statement [was] presumed to be false, '88 and a defendant
81 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
82 J. GUSFIELD, COMMUNITY: A CRITICAL RESPONSE 29 (975).
3 K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 10-13
(1966).
84 See Post, Foundations of Defamation Law, supra note 72, at 711-15, 735-39. The common
law's protection of privacy also attempts to safeguard civility rules, and thus to preserve both
the personality of individuals and the identity of the community. See Post, Foundations of
Privacy, supra note 72, at 959-66, 979-86.
85 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125.
86 See De Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250, 251 (K.B. x605).
87 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supa note 85, at *126. See 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 18-24 (2d ed. 1832). In the eyes of the early common law, "'the greater the truth, the
greater the libel.'" Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM.
L. REV. 727, 735 (1942) (quoting Lord Mansfield). On the subsequent history of the defense of
truth in indictments for criminal defamation, see L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
§ 64, at 324-27 (1978); Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as
a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 790-805 (1964); and Ray, Truth: A Defense to
Libel, 26 MINN. L. REV. 43, 43-49 (1931).
88 L. ELDREDGE, supra note 87, § 63, at 323.
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HeinOnline -- 103 Harv. L. Rev.  618 1989-1990
I99O] CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 619
had to overcome this presumption to avoid liability. Hence in cases
like the Hustler parody, where truth was either difficult or impossible
to establish because the defamatory communication did not contain
factual statements, the defendant would be held liable. Thus private
plaintiffs, and even public officials, could recover damages for the
publication of satire containing defamatory ridicule.8 9
This tradition of focusing the tort primarily on the regulation of
uncivil communications was most famously summarized by Learned
Hand in an opinion upholding a libel judgment based upon a photo-
graph that asserted nothing whatever about a plaintiff, either true or
false, but that nevertheless exposed him "to more than trivial ridi-
cule." 90 Hand stated that "it is a non sequitur to argue that whenever
truth is not a defense, there can be no libel; that would invert the
proper approach to the whole subject." 91 The function of the tort was
to provide redress for uncivil communications, which subject persons
to "'ridicule, scandal, reproach, scorn, and indignity,"' 92 and "[t]he
only reason why the law makes truth a defense is not because a libel
must be false, but because the utterance of truth is in all circumstances
an interest paramount to reputation." 93
About the turn of the century, the traditional common law ap-
proach to truth began to change. Instead of a defendant's burden of
proving truth, courts began to speak of a plaintiff's burden of proving
falsity. To shift the burden of proof in this manner is essentially to
narrow the focus of the tort from communications whose content is
uncivil, to communications whose content is uncivil by reason of false
statements of fact. The tort's altered focus is reflected in the elements
of the cause of action for defamation contained in the first Restatement
of Torts, which stated that "[t]o create liability for defamation there
must be an unprivileged publication of false and defamatory matter."94
The Restatement did not completely abandon the focus of the tradi-
tional common law, however, for it also expressly retained a provision
providing that an actionable communication "may consist of a state-
ment of opinion."95 Although conceding that the legal characterization
89 See, e.g., Doherty v. Kansas City Star Co., 144 Kan. 206, 59 P.2d 30 (i936); Brown v.
Harrington, 208 Mass. 6oo, 95 N.E. 655 (1911); Ellis v. Kimball, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 132 (1834);
D. THOMAS, A LONG TIME BURNING: THE HISTORY OF LITERARY CENSORSHIP IN ENGLAND
56-61 (1969). Two caveats to the point in text are necessary. First, liability depended on the
application of the common law privilege of "fair comment," discussed at pp. 627-29 below.
Second, the common law ordinarily refused to predicate liability upon mere "name-calling" or
vile "epithets." See R. SMOLLA, LAw OF DEFAMATION § 4.03 (3d ed. 1989).
90 Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 154 (quoting Complaint, Burton (No. 258)).
93 Id. at 156.
94 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 558 (1938).
95 Id. § 566. The accompanying comment noted that if a communication "expresses a
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of opinion may depend on "propriety" rather than "truth or falsity,"
the Restatement nevertheless insisted that "a defamatory communi-
cation may be made by derogatory adjectives or epithets as well as
by statements of fact. 96 It even illustrated the point with an example
containing political criticism:
A, while making a political speech, accurately relates certain specific
conduct of his opponent in blocking reform measures advocated by
A. In the course of his argument, A declares that any person who
would so conduct himself is no better than a murderer. A has defamed
his opponent. . . .97
The first Restatement thus contained within it two distinct visions
of the tort of defamation, 98 one retaining the traditional focus on the
regulation of uncivil communications, the other reflecting the newer
focus on the regulation of communications that were uncivil by reason
of false statements of fact. This dual focus was also evident in the
tentative drafts of the second Restatement. They retained both the
requirement that defamatory statements be "false,"99 and the provision
enabling actionable defamation to consist solely of expressions of opin-
ion. 100 Indeed, as recently as May 23, 1974, the American Law
Institute approved the insertion into the second Restatement of a new
section entitled "Ridicule," which provided that "[a] defamatory com-
munication may consist of words or other matter which ridicule an-
other."101 The comment to the section stated that:
sufficiently derogatory opinion as to the conduct in question, it is defamatory and, unless it is
privileged as fair comment, is actionable." Id. § 566 comment a (citation omitted).
96 Id. § 566 comment a.
97 Id. § 566 comment a illustration. The Restatement also noted, however, that A's criticism
might be privileged as "fair comment." See id. For a discussion of the privilege of fair comment,
see pp. 627-29 below.
98 The inconsistency has been well explored by George Christie. See Christie, Defamatory
Opinions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1625-28 (1977).
99 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). The drafters
strengthened the requirement on April s, 1975. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(a)
(Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). The final version of § 558 provides: "To create liability for
defamation there must be: (a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another . . . . " Id.
100 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). The Tentative
Draft did, however, insert the following comment: "Even though an expression of a derogatory
opinion is defamatory, the Constitution may restrict the maintaining of an action for defamation
if it deals with a matter of public or general interest." Id. § 566 comment a.
101 Id. § 567A (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974); see also 5I ALI PROCEEDINGS 302-39 (1974)
(reporting the discussion on the eventual abandonment of § 567A); Christie, supra note 98, at
1628-3o (describing the proposal and initial endorsement of § 567A). Dean Prosser, as Reporter,
first introduced this section in 1965; he stated that "[r]idicule appears nowhere in the Restate-
ment, and since it is a common form of defamation it seemed obvious that it should go
somewhere." 42 ALl PROCEEDINGS 404 (1965).
IVol. io3:6oi
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One common form of defamation is ridicule, which in effect is the
expression of an opinion that the plaintiff is ridiculous, and so exposes
him to contempt or derision, or other derogatory feelings. Humorous
writings, verses, cartoons or caricatures which carry a sting and cause
adverse rather than sympathetic or neutral merriment, may be de-
famatory. 10 2
One month later, on June 25, I974, the Supreme Court in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc. 10 3 issued its famous dictum on the constitutional
protection of opinion:
We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges
and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no
constitutional value in false statements of facts. ' 0 4
The Gertz dictum definitively preempted the traditional common law
understanding of truth, and decisively shifted the focus of the tort to
communications that are uncivil by reason of false statements of
fact.' 05 Common law regulation of other kinds of uncivil communi-
cations, as for example those that offend against decency by reason
of true statements of fact or by reason of ridicule, was for this reason
displaced to torts like invasion of privacy 10 6 or the intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
This is of course exactly what happened to Jerry Falwell in his
suit against Flynt. Because the Gertz dicta had immunized plainly
defamatory ridicule such as the Hustler parody, Falwell was forced
to offer a theory of his case that predicated liability on the basis of
the comparatively more recent tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Although the latter tort has quite different elements
from those of defamation, it nevertheless has a closely analogous
sociological structure.
Until well into the twentieth century, the "long-recognized com-
mon-law rule" did not permit claims "for mental suffering only." 0 7
By 1939, however, at about the same time that the tort of defamation
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 567A comment a (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
103 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
104 Id. at 339-40 (footnote omitted).
105 See Bezanson, The Libel Tort Today, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 540-41 (1988).
106 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). The early privacy cases perceived
a definite connection between the theory of truth in criminal libel ("the greater the truth, the
greater the libel") and the rationale of the privacy tort. See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 555-56, 64 N.E. 442, 447 (19o2); see also L. ELDREDGE, supra note
87, § 66, at 330-31 & n.41; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REv. 1033, io6i (1936) ("[The] 'right of privacy,' is a flank attack upon the doctrine
that truth is an absolute defense in libel and slander.").
107 Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612, 615 (1916).
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was shifting its focus to false statements of fact, Dean Prosser could
write that "[i]t is time to recognize that the courts have created a new
tort" regulating "the intentional, outrageous infliction of mental suf-
fering in an extreme form.' 10 8 The new tort was recognized by the
drafters of the second Restatement in 1948,109 and is now widely
accepted. 110 Although the four elements of the tort set forth in Vir-
ginia law are entirely typical,"' "the tort, despite its apparent abun-
dance of elements, in practice tends to reduce to a single element -
the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct." 112
This reduction occurs because of the strong tendency to assume
that "the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct
is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed," 1 3 so that
the element of "severe" emotional distress is generally satisfied by a
plaintiff's simple recitation that he has been upset. The tendency is
illustrated by the Falwell case itself, where the independent evidence
of Falwell's mental anguish was minimal, to say the least." 4 The
implicit assumption that outrageous conduct necessarily produces emo-
tional distress also satisfies the requirement that there be "a causal
connection between the wrongdoer's conduct and the emotional dis-
tress."" 5  Consequently the element of causality is most often met, as
in the Falwell case, by the simple testimony of a plaintiff. Finally,
the element of intent or recklessness is usually satisfied by the notion
that a defendant "should have known" that outrageous conduct would
produce emotional distress. The question thus becomes whether the
defendant's conduct was itself intentional.
The "collapse"" 6 of the tort's four elements into the single question
of the outrageousness of the defendant's behavior is sociologically
108 Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874,
874 (i939). See generally Magruder, supra note io6 (describing the emergence of a broad tort
principle affording relief for emotional distress in the more outrageous cases).
109 See Pedrick, Intentional Infliction: Should Section 46 Be Revised?, 13 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 1, 2-5 (1985).
110 For a state by state survey of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, see
LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, 50-STATE SURVEY 1988: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
MEDIA LIBEL AND INVASION OF PRIVACY LAW 926-67 (H. Kaufman ed. 1988).
II See supra note 32. Section 46 of the Second Restatement now provides: "One who by
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 (1977).
112 Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42,
42-49 (1982); see Note, Threat to Free Speech, supra note 46, at 1004-o8.
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1977).
114 See supra notes 23 & 36. The intrinsic and reciprocal relationship between the outra-
geousness of the Hustler parody and the existence of Falwell's distress is perceptively noted by
Rodney Smolla, who asks, "How could such an ad not inflict distress ... ?" R. SMOLLA, supra
note 8, at I58 (emphasis in original).
I's Womack v. Eldridge, 2,5 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974).
116 See Givelber, supra note 112, at 49. For a rare example of a court consciously resisting
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significant. Outrageous behavior is precisely conduct which "offends
against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality,""17
and which is therefore, in the influential words of the second Re-
statement, "utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally,
the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment against the
actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!""' 8 Because well-so-
cialized members of a "civilized community" have incorporated into
their very identities the "generally accepted standards of decency and
morality" policed by the tort, they experience behavior which violates
those standards as profoundly demeaning, disrespectful, and painful.
The expectation of a spontaneous and negative emotional reaction to
such behavior is so powerful that the Restatement (and most courts)
use it to define the behavior to be regulated. It is no wonder that
juries have been willing to do the same.
The reciprocal dependence of personality and civility thus under-
mines the formal structure of the tort and leads to the "collapse" of
its distinct elements. Even though the tort as a doctrinal matter
follows the pattern of a negligence action, in which a defendant is
held liable if and only if his unacceptable conduct actually causes
demonstrable injury, the practical structure of the tort instead resem-
bles actions for defamation or invasion of privacy, which have no
independent requirement that a plaintiff allege or prove actual in-
jury." 9 From a sociological point of view, the tort functions, as do
this "collapse," see Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, Inc., 515 Pa. 183, 197-98, 527
A.2d 988, 995 (1987).
117 Womack, 215 Va. at 342, 22o S.E.2d at 148.
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1977). For a sampling of the
immense influence of this comment, see Teamsters Local 959 v. Wells, 749 P.2d 349, 357 n.13
(Alaska 1988); Watts v. Golden Age Nursing Home, 127 Ariz. 255, 258, 619 P.2d 1032, 1035
(i98o); Haldeman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 98, 104-o5 (Iowa 1985); Roberts v.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 422 Mich. 594, 602-05, 374 N.W.2d 905, 9o8-io (1985); Dominguez v.
Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 214, 638 P.2d 423, 426 (i98i); Breeden v. League Servs. Corp., 575 P.2d
1374, 2376 (Okla. 1978); and Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 739-40,
565 P.2d 1173, 1I76 (i977).
119 At common law, of course, the publication of a defamatory statement carried with it an
irrebuttable presumption of injury. See Post, Foundations of Defamation Law, supra note 72,
at 697-99. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Supreme Court held this
irrebuttable presumption of injury unconstitutional, and required instead some showing of
"actual injury," which could include proof of "personal humiliation, and mental anguish and
suffering." Id. at 349-50, Eleven years later the Court held that the common law presumption
was constitutional where the plaintiff is a private figure and the communication at issue does
not involve "matter[s] of public concern." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 762 (2985) (plurality opinion).
Invasions of privacy have also been regarded as intrinsically harmful, so that a plaintiff need
make no independent demonstration of injury. See Post, Foundations of Privacy, supra note
72, at 964-66. The first Restatement of Torts, for example, stated that damages in a privacy
action "can be awarded in the same way in which general damages are given for defamation."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 comment d (1939). The second Restatement, despite the holding
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these latter actions, to penalize those defendants who breach civility
rules, regardless of the contingent consequences of that behavior.
For this reason the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, like common law actions for defamation and invasion of privacy,
in practice serves at least two distinct purposes. It not only provides
relief for those whose personalities have been threatened by uncivil
behavior, but it also serves to safeguard those "generally accepted
standards of decency and morality"'120 that define for us the meaning
of life in a "civilized community.' 121
Many of these standards, of course, inhere in norms of commu-
nication, norms that define the terms of civil discussion. As the Court
recently stressed in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,122 these
norms are particularly important for the maintenance of "public dis-
course," because "'the habits and manners of civility"' are "'indis-
pensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the
nation.""u 23 Professor Michelman makes essentially the same point
when he argues that public discussion cannot be "jurisgenerative"
unless it "is not considered or experienced as coercive, or invasive, or
otherwise a violation of one's identity or freedom.'1 24 Yet the Falwell
opinion prohibits the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
from enforcing, in the absence of a knowingly false assertion of fact,
precisely those norms which define civility and hence which would
restrain speech likely to be experienced as coercive and violative of
identity.
As this discussion illustrates, moreover, the opinion's precise jus-
tification for this prohibition is patently inadequate. The Court stated
that "in the area of political and social discourse" the distinction
between outrageous and non-outrageous opinion is not "principled"
and hence constitutionally inappropriate, because it "has an inherent
subjectiveness about it" that would permit liability to be imposed
in Gertz, permits the recovery of damages for the "interest in privacy" harmed by the alleged
tortious conduct, whether or not a plaintiff has suffered actual injury such as mental distress
or special damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (1977); see also Socialist
Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States, 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1421 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); cf. Manville v. Borg-Warner Corp., 418 F.2d 434, 437 (xoth Cir. 1969) (holding that a
plaintiff can recover a nominal award in a privacy suit without showing special or general
damages); Cason v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 40-41, 30 So. 2d 635, 640 (1947) (stating that nominal
damages are appropriate for invasion of privacy without any other harm).
120 Womack, 215 Va. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148.
121 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1977).
122 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
123 Id. at 681-82 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 228 (1968)). The Court noted that "the 'fundamental values necessary to the maintenance
of a democratic political system' disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly
threatening to others." Id. at 683 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
124 Michelman, supra note 2, at 1527.
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merely on the basis of "tastes" or preferences.' 25 Although this rea-
soning accurately captures a central theme of first amendment juris-
prudence, 126 the reasoning seems deeply misplaced in the context of
a tort that appeals to intersubjective, rather than to private, standards
of judgment. Outrageous behavior is that which violates community
values, rather than merely personal or idiosyncratic preferences. 127
The Court's reference to "tastes" fails to recognize that taste constitutes
an appeal to social and common standards of evaluation, and thus
that "taste, in its essential nature, is not private, but a social phenom-
enon." 128 Immanuel Kant's classic modern formulation of this point
contrasts taste, which "demands" the agreement of others, with the
sense of the agreeable or pleasant, concerning which "every one is
content that his judgement, which he bases upon private feeling, and
by which he says of an object that it pleases him, should be limited
merely to his own person."' 29
To claim that speech is outrageous is to assert much more than
that it is personally unpleasant or disagreeable; it is to claim that the
speech is undesirable because it is inconsistent with common canons
of decency. Such a claim may be controversial, but it need be neither
arbitrary nor subjective. This is recognized even within the narrow
confines of first amendment doctrine, which draws the line between
constitutionally protected and unprotected speech on the basis of such
structurally similar claims as that speech is "prurient" (when measured
by ""'contemporary community standards"' " 130 ) and hence obscene,
or that speech is of a kind whose "very utterance inflict[s] injury" and
hence constitutes "fighting words,' 131 or that speech is "'vulgar,' 'of-
fensive,' and 'shocking,"' and hence not fit for broadcast over the
radio during daytime hours.132
It is evident, then, that what is driving the Falwell opinion is not
that the distinction between outrageous and non-outrageous speech is
125 See io8 S. Ct. at 881-82. The Court reiterated this reasoning one month later in Boos
v. Barry, io8 S. Ct. 1157 (1988), when it rejected a statute that regulated speech offensive to
the "dignity" of foreign diplomats, stating that such "[a] 'dignity' standard, like the 'outrageous-
ness' standard that we rejected in Hustler," would be "inherently subjective." Id. at 1164.
126 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21, 25 (1971).
127 For a recent and lucid discussion of this distinction, see Sagoff, Values and Preferences,
96 ETHICS 301 (i986).
128 H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 34 (G. Barden & J. Cumming trans. 2d ed. 2975).
129 I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 46 (J. Bernard trans. 1968). Kant continues: "Thus
he is quite contented that if he says, 'Canary wine is pleasant,' another man may correct his
expression and remind him that he ought to say, 'It is pleasant to me."' Id. at 57 (emphasis in
original).
130 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 4o8 U.S. 229,
230 (1972) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (I957))).
131 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
132 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978).
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subjective or arbitrary, but rather that it is constitutionally inappro-
priate as a standard for the legal regulation of public discourse. The
question, of course, is exactly why the distinction is inappropriate,
and on this question the Falwell opinion is not forthcoming.
The opinion is clear, however, about its concern constitutionally
to protect a special kind of "world of debate about public affairs,"' 33
and it is with this concern that the construction of an adequate
explanatory theory must begin.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
There has traditionally been a strong affinity between first amend-
ment jurisprudence and the concept of the public. The "Court has
emphasized that the First Amendment 'embraces at the least the
liberty to discuss publicly . . . all matters of public concern.' 1 34 It
has stated more than once "that expression on public issues 'has always
rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment val-
ues,"' 35 and that speech on matters "of public concern" is "entitled to
special protection.' 36 The same is true for speech about "public
persons," a class consisting of "those who hold governmental office,"
and those "who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or
the vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention, are
properly classed as public figures."137
The concept of the public has a number of different meanings for
first amendment doctrine. One important meaning is the designation
of speech that will be deemed constitutionally independent of the
managerial authority of state institutions. This is the meaning that
the concept of the public holds in contemporary "public forum" doc-
trine. 138 But in the context of a case like Falwell the concept expresses
quite a different meaning. It refers instead to the protection of speech
from the control of community norms like those enforced by the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. This section explores
some of the justifications and consequences of that protection.
13 Falwell, io8 S. Ct. at 88o.
134 Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (ig8o) (quoting
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 10 (1940)).
135 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (x982) (quoting Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 467 (398o)).
136 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983); see Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986); Thornhill v. Alabama, 3ro U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940).
137 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
138 See generally Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of
the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, r784-8oo (1987).
[Vol. IO3:6oi
HeinOnline -- 103 Harv. L. Rev.  626 1989-1990
I990] CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 627
A. Public Discourse and Community
The concept of "public discourse" at issue in a decision like Falwell
is in many respects unique and counter-intuitive. These qualities can
perhaps best be made visible by comparing the first amendment con-
cept of public discourse to a competing notion that developed in the
early nineteenth century in the common law privilege of "fair com-
ment." The privilege, with many local and chronological variations,
roughly functioned to immunize the publication of honestly held but
defamatory opinions about matters of public concern that were fair
and communicated without malice.139
The origins of the privilege have been traced back to an i8o8
decision involving the harsh criticism of three travel books. 140 Al-
though the criticism was otherwise defamatory, the judge charged the
jury that:
Every man who publishes a book commits himself to the judgment
of the public, and anyone may comment upon his performance....
[W]hatever their merits, others have a right to pass their judgment
upon them - to censure them if they be censurable, and to turn them
into ridicule if they be ridiculous.141
Any other conclusion, the judge stated, would permit the author of a
book to "maintain a monopoly of sentiment and opinion respecting
it.)"142
As the privilege achieved recognition and expanded to embrace
purely political discussion, the elements of the privilege also came
more sharply into focus. Although articulated differently by various
judges at various times, these elements included a variety of require-
ments, including that the privileged comment represent the honest
belief of the speaker;143 that the comment state opinion rather than
fact; 144 and that the comment concern matters "of public interest,"
139 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 606-607 (1938); i W. ODGERS, THE LAW OF
LIBEL AND SLANDER 34-68 (1887); Boyer, Fair Comment, i5 OHIO ST. L.J. 28o (i954); Town-
send, The English Law Governing the Right of Criticism and Fair Comment, 30 AM. L. REG.
517 (189i).
140 Carr v. Hood, 17o Eng. Rep. 983 n.*, i Camp. 355 n.* (K.B. i8o8); see Hallen, Fair
Comment, 8 TEx. L. REV. 41, 43-44 (1929).
141 Carr, 17o Eng. Rep. at 985 n.*, i Camp. at 358 n.*; see also Veeder, Freedom of Public
Discussion, 23 HARv. L. REv. 413, 414 (I9io) (describing literary criticism as the first discourse
to receive the privilege of fair comment).
142 Carr, 17o Eng. Rep. at 985 n.*, i Camp. at 357 n.*.
143 See Veeder, supra note 141, at 425-26.
144 See Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 875, 878-
8o (1949); Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Dispute in Fair
Comment, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1203, 1203-o5 (1962). A minority of American jurisdictions held
that the privilege should extend also to false statements of fact, provided that the other conditions
of the privilege were also met. See Noel, supra, at 891; Post, Defaming Public Officials: On
Doctrine and Legal History, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. (Review Essay) 539, 552-53.
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rather than, for example, the merely "private character" of public
persons like authors or politicians. 145 Successful invocation of the
privilege also required that the comment be without malice, 146 mean-
ing that the comment be made for "a well-defined public purpose"
rather than "for some ulterior and improper purpose," 147 and that the
comment not be framed in too intemperate a fashion.148
At first blush, the privilege of fair comment resembles the consti-
tutional privilege that emerges from Falwell: both privileges attempt
to define an arena of specifically "public" discourse, and both rely for
their rationale on the distinction between opinion and fact. But this
resemblance is merely superficial, for in fact the two privileges pre-
suppose radically different concepts of public discourse.
The privilege of fair comment defines a "world of debate about
public affairs" that is pervasively normative, in that it focuses upon
whether a public communication has been made "upon a proper oc-
casion, from a proper motive, in a proper manner and . . .based
upon reasonable or probable cause."'149 The privilege of fair comment
thus envisions public debate as infused with and controlled by pre-
cisely "the habits and manners of civility" praised by the Court in
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser. 1'0 Although courts applying
the privilege used various doctrinal tests, like the distinction between
fact and opinion, the nature of malice, or the scope of the legitimate
interests of the public, in the end these tests were merely tools by
which courts could analyze such normative questions as whether it is
civil and appropriate in public discourse to attribute base motivations
to public persons, 151 to scrutinize the private character or personal
life of such persons, 5 2 or to express one's evaluations of such persons
with "contemptuous allusions, and sarcastic phrases, well calculated
to humiliate, and . . . devoid of all cast of fair comment. ' 153
145 See Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1207-I (1949).
146 See Carman, Hutchinson v. Proxmire and the Neglected Fair Comment Defense: An
Alternative to "Actual Malice," 3o DE PAUL L. REV. i, ii (1g8o); Thayer, Fair Comment as a
Defense, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 288, 306-07.
147 Veeder, supra note 141, at 425.
148 See Note, supra note 145, at 1216.
149 Bausewine v. Norristown Herald, 351 Pa. 634, 645, 41 A.2d 736, 742, cert. denied 326
U.S. 724 (1945); see Preveden v. Croation Fraternal Union of America, 98 F. Supp. 784, 786
(W.D. Pa. 1951).
150 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
151 See Boyer, supra note 139, at 290-92; Hallen, supra note 14o, at 74-8I; Noel, supra note
144, at 881-87; Note, supra note 145, at 1209-10.
152 See Boyer, supra note 139, at 290-92; Hallen, supra note 140, at 81-86; Riesman,
Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment 11, 42 COLUM. L. REV. x282, 1289-
90 (1942); Note, supra note 145, at 1210-Il.
153 Williams v. Hicks Printing Co., 159 Wis. 90, 102, 15o N.W. 183, 188 (1914); see also
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 314 (1922).
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The privilege of fair comment, in other words, functioned to in-
terpret and uphold norms of civility, in the same manner as did the
underlying tort of defamation. Although the existence of the privilege
indicated that public discourse had for the common law its own
somewhat distinct rules of civility, which permitted a freer play of
opinion than in private life, the common law nevertheless subordi-
nated that discourse to community notions of propriety and decency.
In line with this subordination, the common law allocated to the jury,
as the representative of the community, the determination as to the
applicability of the privilege of fair comment.' 5 4 By this means the
common law firmly embedded the sphere of public discourse within
a community defined by rules of civility and respect.
Exactly the opposite is true, however, of the sphere of public
discourse defined by first amendment doctrine. Since the 193o's, the
Supreme Court has regularly expressed a specifically constitutional
vision of a "world of debate about public affairs" that transcends the
bounds and perspectives of any particular community. An early and
classic articulation of this vision appears in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
5 5
in which a Jehovah's Witness had been convicted of the common law
crime of inciting breach of the peace because of speech that was
concededly highly offensive to his Catholic audience. The Court held
that the speech was constitutionally protected:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp
differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the
rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of
view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to
vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or
state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have
ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a
democracy.
The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under their
shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop
unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary
than in our own country for a people composed of many races and of
many creeds. ' 5 6
The passage is extraordinarily rich and allusive, and it merits close
attention. It sketches a sphere of constitutional immunity that extends
154 See P. LEWIS, GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 748-750 (8th ed. 198i); RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS §§ 618-6i9 (1938). The court, however, retained the authority to determine
whether the "defamatory criticism" involved "a matter of public concern." Id. § 618(i).
15S 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
156 Id. at 31o. The holding of Cantwel also rested in part upon the free exercise clause of
the first amendment.
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to speech about public subjects, like "religious faith" or "political
belief" or "prominent" persons, even though such speech violates the
most elementary civility rules against "exaggeration" or "vilification"
or "excesses and abuses." The justification for this immunity is that
America contains "many" diverse communities which are often in
sharp conflict. If the state were to enforce the civility rules of one
community, say those of Catholics, as against those of another, say
Jehovah's Witnesses, the state would in effect be using its power and
authority to support some communities and repress others. But the
first amendment forbids the state from doing this, in order that "many
types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested
and unobstructed. "157
Cantwell thus refused to enforce civility rules within a constitu-
tionally defined sphere of public discourse because it perceived com-
munities as labile and evolving. If the common law privilege of fair
comment reflected and enforced the civility rules of a fixed and estab-
lished community that contained within itself a distinct sphere of
public discourse, first amendment doctrine since Cantwell has instead
maintained a sphere of public discourse in which communities them-
selves develop through competition for the allegiance of individual
adherents.' 58 The constitutional "shield" established by Cantwell en-
sures that this competition occurs on a level playing field, in which
no particular community can obtain an unfair advantage and use the
power of the state to prejudge the outcome of this competition by
enforcing its own special norms or civility rules. This special neu-
trality is reflected in the fact that the Constitution shifts the primary
locus of decisionmaking away from the jury, which represents com-
munity standards, to the judge, who represents instead an impartial
and overarching public order, and who exercises "independent review"
to determine matters of "constitutional fact."159
Although Cantwell concluded with what has by now become a
familiar image of constitutional neutrality, close attention to its logic
reveals that this image actually rests on the assumption that com-
munity life is constituted by the voluntary choices of its members. It
is for this reason that Cantwell viewed the function of the first amend-
ment to be safeguarding the potential for new and more satisfactory
choices.160 This vision differs fundamentally from that expressed by
157 Id.
158 See Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First
Amendment, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 319-20 (i988).
159 See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2694-95
(1989); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 498-511 (1984).
160 The importance of this potential to American sensibilities can hardly be overestimated.
It underlies, for example, John Dewey's assertion, which seems almost blandly trite, that
"[dlemocracy is a way of life controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of human nature."
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the common law torts of defamation and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, which conceive the self as instead constituted by com-
munity norms. These torts penalize speech that violates civility rules
because they understand such speech to damage the very identity of
community members; first amendment doctrine, on the other hand,
rests on the possibility of using speech to create new identities.
Ultimately, then, the logic of Cantwell places the Constitution
firmly on the side of those individuals who would attempt to use
speech to alter the terms of community life. This is an important
source of the strong "intellectual individualism" that characterizes first
amendment doctrine. 161 The most eloquent expression of that indi-
vidualism is perhaps in Cohen v. California, in which the Court
rejected the authority of the state to punish "unseemly" speech so as
to maintain "a suitable level of discourse within the body politic":
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity
and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the
premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests. 16 2
The concept of a neutral sphere of public discourse, which derives
from this commitment to individualism, has powerful implications for
the civility rules enforced by the common law tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The specific "outrageousness" standard
at issue in Falwell, for example, can have meaning only within the
Dewey, Creative Democracy - The Task Before Us, in CLASSIC AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS 389,
391 (M. Fisch ed. 195i).
161 West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (I943). For a discussion of
the effects of that individualism, see Post, cited above in note 158, at 319-24.
16' 403 U.S. IS, 23-24 (1971) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)). The individualism of first amendment doctrine is linked to the inner-
most logic of democracy. To the extent that personality and social structure are interdependent,
and to the extent that democracy is a social structure in which persons must continually choose
their values and commitments, democracy must at root presuppose citizens autonomous enough
to create, rather than be created by, their communities. Hence Whitman's famous celebration
of American government as founded upon "the theory of development and perfection by vol-
untary standards, and self-reliance," and as premised upon the "idea of perfect individualism."
V. WHITMAN, Democratic Vistas, in LEAVES OF GRASS, AND SELECTED PROSE 460, 471 (J.
Kouwenhoven ed. i95o). The concept of democracy thus itself contains quite radical implications
that point toward a very different image of the self than that which justifies the regulation of
defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The tentative development of these
implications, in a context quite distinct from that of first amendment doctrine, appears in Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. i86, rgg (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, io HARv. L. REv. 737, 783-99 (1989).
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commonly accepted norms of a particular community. But the con-
stitutional concept of public discourse forbids the state from enforcing
such a standard within the "world of debate about public affairs,"1 63
because to do so would privilege a specific community and prejudice
the ability of individuals to persuade others of the need to change it.
Outrageous speech calls community identity into question, practically
as well as cognitively, and thus it has unique power to focus attention,
dislocate old assumptions, and shock its audience into the recognition
of unfamiliar forms of life.
Of course, on this account, an "outrageousness" standard is un-
acceptable not because it "has an inherent subjectiveness about it,' 164
but rather because it would enable a single community to use the
authority of the state to confine speech within its own notions of
propriety.165 Falwell itself gestures toward this latter explanation by
defending its holding on the ground of the "oft-repeated" premise that
"'it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government
must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.'166 The difficulty
with this gesture, however, is that, like most modern commentary, it
conceives of neutrality only at the level of ideas, rather than at the
more general level of the structures that establish communal life. We
might correct this difficulty by saying that the concept of public
discourse requires the state to remain neutral in the "marketplace of
communities."
It is important to note, however, that this neutrality does not and
cannot extend to public life generally, where it is natural and com-
monplace for law to regulate behavior in ways that implement one or
another specific image of communal identity. We outlaw drug abuse
or racial discrimination because we believe that such conduct is in-
consistent with whom we want to be. But the central thrust of
modern first amendment doctrine is to prohibit speech from being
regulated in this way. The consequence of this prohibition is to ensure
that the various forms of identity enacted by public law remain subject
163 Falwell, io8 S. Ct. at 88o.
164 Id. at 882.
165 The same point could be made about the Court's refusal to implement a "dignity" standard
in Boos v. Barry, io8 S. Ct. 1157, 1164 (1988). See supra note 125. Although not inherently
subjective, a "dignity" standard is intrinsically connected to the particular norms of a specific
community. As Richard Rorty has observed,
'[I]ntrinsic human dignity' is the comparative dignity of a group with which a person
identifies herself. Nations or churches or movements are, on this view, shining historical
examples not because they reflect rays emanating from a higher source, but because of
contrast-effects - comparisons with other, worse communities. Persons have dignity not
as an interior luminescence, but because they share in such contrast-effects.
Rorty, Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, 80 J. PHIL. 583, 586-87 (1983). State regulation of
speech on the basis of a "dignity" standard, therefore, would impose the "example" of a particular
community.
166 xo8 S. Ct. at 882 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978)).
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to the perennial evaluation of speech, and so to that limited extent
vulnerable and provisional. 167 Thus the ambition of constitutional
law to create a distinct realm of public discourse independent of the
norms of any particular community has forced first amendment doc-
trine sharply to separate communication from behavior. The common
law privilege of fair comment, however, by subjecting public discourse
to community norms like any other form of conduct, effaces this
distinction between speech and action.
Constitutional law and common law, then, embody fundamentally
different concepts of public discourse. 168
B. The Structure of Public Discourse
The very notion that discourse can proceed independently of the
norms of ordinary community life should pose something of a puzzle.
Cohen tells us that "the arena of public discussion" constituted by the
first amendment is designed to produce "a more perfect polity.' 69 But
how can this be true if those who participate in that arena speak to
each other across the deep chasms that divide American communities
from each other? We may well ask how such persons can find com-
mon ground to support a discussion that will be to their mutual
advantage.
Curiously, at about the time the Supreme Court was fashioning
its special concept of public discourse, American sociologists were
developing a strikingly analogous notion of the "public," which they
viewed as a form of social organization transcending particular com-
munities and existing only in the presence of diverse and conflicting
forms of communal life. In his 1933 article on The Concept of the
Public, for example, Carroll Clark noted that "[b]efore a group can
become a public there must be a confrontation of divergent attitudes
involving the tacit or expressed rules that set the pattern of behavior
and fix judgment of consequences. "170 Thus "publics come into exis-
tence" only when "social organization is widened and complicated by
economic and cultural differentiation that entail incompatible schemes
of group behavior.' 1 As a sociologist, however, Clark was forced to
confront explicitly the question of what holds a public together as a
167 As Harold Lasswell wrote in 1941, at a time when public debates were closing down all
over the world, a society "is acting as a public when it makes debatable demands for collective
action," but it is acting as a crowd "[w]henever a topic is beyond debate." H. LASSWELL,
DEMOCRACY THROUGH PUBLIC OPINION 20 (1941). Gabriel de Tarde first introduced the
distinction between the public and the crowd in L'OPINION ET LA FOULE (i9io).
168 To avoid terminological confusion, the remainder of this Article refers to "public dis-
course" only as the kind of public dialogue defined by constitutional doctrine.
169 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. I5, 24 (i97i).
170 Clark, The Concept of the Public, 13 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 311, 314 (1933).
171 Id. at 315.
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viable social formation across the rifts of such cultural differentiation.
His answer, by no means idiosyncratic, is quite striking from the
perspective of first amendment scholarship: "'A public is, in fact,
organized on the basis of a universe of discourse .... 11,172
A public, in other words, is constituted precisely by the ability of
persons to speak to one another across the boundaries of divergent
cultures. From this perspective, of course, the social function of first
amendment doctrine, as reformulated during the 193o's and 1940's,
becomes plain enough: it is to establish a protected space within which
this communication can occur. Sociologically viewed, however, the
continued existence of this space depends upon at least five precon-
ditions. First, a society must include a plurality of cultures and
traditions. A society characterized by the norms of only one com-
munity will lack the impetus to liberate its public discourse from the
regulation of those norms. At least in America, the recognition of
"rich cultural diversities" 173 has spurred the disengagement of public
discourse from the values of any single community. Since Cantwell
the acknowledgement of these competing traditions has been a contin-
ual theme of first amendment jurisprudence.
Second, even a culturally heterogeneous society cannot sustain
public discourse unless the society values and wishes to preserve that
heterogeneity. Just as Jerry Falwell sought to impose his notion of
the "outrageous" onto Larry Flynt's satire, so too will powerful com-
munities seek to use the authority of the state to impose their own
norms on speech generally. 174 The common law torts of defamation
and invasion of privacy represent just such efforts to use law to subject
communication to "universal" cultural standards. 175 In the absence of
a commitment to diversity, therefore, the fact of heterogeneity may
well be submerged within a legal tendency toward uniformity. First
amendment jurisprudence is committed to diversity because of its
methodological individualism, which, I have argued, ultimately de-
rives from its voluntaristic conception of community life. 176 The first
amendment requires state neutrality in the marketplace of communi-
ties precisely because it views membership in such communities as
172 Id. at 313 (quoting R. PARK & E. BURGESS, INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF SOCI-
OLOGY 254 (1924)); see C. DAwsON & W. GETTYS, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY 621-22
(3d ed. 1948). For an example of the influence of defining the "public" in terms of a "universe
of discourse," see K. BOULDING, THE IMAGE 132-47 (1956).
173 See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (I943).
174 See Post, supra note 158, at 3o6-14.
175 See Post, Foundations of Defamation Law, supra note 72, at 714-I5; Post, Foundations
of Privacy, supra note 72, at 976-78.
176 See supra pp. 630-31. On "individualism" as one of "the values of the American Creed,"
see S. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 14 (198i).
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flowing from individual choice. The individual thus becomes the
privileged unit of social action.177
Third, those participating in public discourse can communicate
with each other only if they have something in common to talk about.
Thus persons cannot constitute "a 'public"' unless "they are exposed
to similar social stimuli." 178 A primary and continuing source of these
stimuli within public discourse is the news. News, as Walter
Lippmann noted long ago, "comes from a distance,' 79 from beyond
the "self-contained community"' 80 in which we happen to live. The
news functions as a medium of common information that brings to-
gether persons of widely disparate traditions and cultures. Thus "news
is a public (and a public-generating) social phenomenon."118  "The
emergence of the mass media and of the 'public' are mutually con-
structive developments. "182 For this reason the first amendment pro-
tects not merely the expression of ideas, but also "the free communi-
cation of information.' 1 83
Fourth, persons must have a reason to enter into the realm of
public discourse to communicate with those beyond their own com-
munities. 184 Clark offers as exemplary the desire for profit in the
marketplace. Individuals from widely disparate cultural backgrounds
participate together in a market, in which decisions are not made
upon "mores" or "tradition," but rather upon commonly available "fact
and news."185 It is important to recognize, however, that the contin-
ued existence of the public space established by the market depends
upon the common motivation of profit. With respect to "the arena of
public discussion" established by the first amendment, the common
motivation must be understood as that of democratic self-governance
and a shared political destiny. Because our government responds to
the desires of "the whole People, who are the publick,' u8 6 individuals
from diverse traditions and communities must attempt to communicate
177 This individualism differs, for example, from the more corporatist values that inform the
regulation of speech in England. See Post, supra note 158, at 310-14. Recent efforts to regulate
pornography have forcefully challenged this individualism. See id. at 329-35.
178 J. BENNETT & M. TUMIN, SOCIAL LIFE: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 140 (1948).
179 IV. LIPPMANN, LIBERTY AND THE NEWS 38 (1920).
180 W. LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 263-75 (1922).
181 A. GOULDNER, THE DIALECTIC OF IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY: THE ORIGINS, GRAM-
MAR, AND FUTURE OF IDEOLOGY io6 (1976).
182 Id. at 95.
183 Schneider v. California, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (i939).
184 See J. DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 27-28 (1927).
185 See Clark, supra note 17o, at 316.
186 Cato's Letters, No. 32, (as reprinted in the New-York Weekly Journal, Feb. 25 and Mar.
4, 1734), reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON IS (L. Levy ed.
1966).
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with each other if they wish to participate in that dialogue which will
ultimately direct the actions of the entire nation.
Fifth, communication requires not merely common information,
but also commonly accepted standards of meaning and evaluation, so
that the significance of that information can be assessed. The necessity
for these standards suggests that the emergence of public discourse
rests upon a delicate balance: if persons in public discourse share too
much, if they are simply members of the same community, the diver-
sity requisite for the emergence of public discourse will not be present.
But if, on the other hand, such persons share too little, if they have
absolutely no common standards for the evaluation and assessment of
meaning, public discourse cannot be sustained. 187
The conduct of public discourse, in other words, requires persons
to share standards, but not the kind of standards that fuse them into
a community. But what can persons in public discourse share in the
"absence of interaction in terms of the conventional and traditional
definitions" 88 of specific communities? The answer given by sociol-
ogists was that persons can share the ability to engage in "intellectual
processes," and they thus defined a "public" as "any group . . . that
achieves corporate unity through critical interaction."18 9 "In the pub-
lic," it was said, "interaction takes the form of discussion. Individuals
act upon one another critically. . . . Opinions clash and thus modify
and moderate one another."190 In the words of a more contemporary
theorist, Alvin Gouldner, the very existence of public discourse implies
"a cleared and safe space"191 in which the interpretation of shared
187 Robert Park, for example, noted that:
Whenever in any political society the diversity of interests and points of view from which
the news is interpreted becomes so great that discussion is no longer possible, then there
is no longer any public opinion . . . . In that case nothing but force, in some form or
other, is capable of maintaining sufficient order to permit, if not the normal, at least the
necessary, social processes to go on. Under such circumstances it is vain to speak of
freedom of speech or of the role of public opinion.
Park, News and the Power of the Press, 47 Am. J. Soc. I, 6 (1941); see A. LOWELL, PUBLIC
OPINION AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT 34-36 (1913). See generally Davison, The Public Opinion
Process, 22 PUB. OPINION Q. 91, 102 (1958) (arguing that the definition of a public does not
"include those who . . . feel no community of interest with it").
188 E. REUTER & C. HART, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY 502 (1933).
189 Id. at 501-02.
190 R. PARK & E. BURGESS, INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY 869 (1921).
Park and Burgess argue that because "public opinion is determined by conflict and discussion,
• . . both sides of an issue get considered," and "contentions are rejected because they will not
stand up to criticism." Id. at 794-95. Thus, "the public . . . is always more or less rational.
It is this fact of conflict, in the form of discussion, that introduces into the control exercised by
public opinion the elements of rationality and fact." Id. at 795; see also C. DAWSON & W.
GETTYS, .supra note 172, at 621-22 ("Divergent opinions, through inter-communication in a
public, tend to inhibit and modify each other until the matter is thought out more or less
dispassionately and a common definition is reached. This shared opinion is termed public
opinion." (emphasis in original)).
191 A. GOULDNER, supra note 181, at 98.
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stimuli, like news, can occur in a "critical" manner, "meaning that
what has been said may be questioned, negated and contradicted." 192
The identification of public discourse with forms of "critical inter-
action" rests upon a very abstract logic. If membership in a com-
munity is "a constituent of ... identity,' 93 the effort to communicate
through public discourse with those who do not share that identity
must entail a constant effort to distance oneself from the assumptions
and certitudes that define oneself and one's community.194 By being
"critical" and "intellectual," public discourse can strive to generalize
its appeal so as to reach persons from disparate cultures and traditions.
The problem, however, is that this conception of public discourse
is highly schematic, and its value as an empirical description may be
questioned. Even the most casual survey of American public delib-
eration would lead to the conclusion that it is "intellectual" and "crit-
ical" only in fits and starts, and that there are unending attempts by
various cultures and traditions to seize control of public discussion
and to subject it to particular community values and standards. 195
But the conception does have considerable power as a description of
how meaningful public discussion can occur in the face of fundamental
and concededly valid cultural divergence. In such circumstances, it
may be said, persons ought to strive to engage in a mutual process of
critical interaction, because if they do not, no uncoerced common
understanding can possibly be attained. 196
First amendment doctrine attempts to protect an arena for just
such a process of critical interaction. Resting upon a deep respect for
the "sharp differences" characteristic of American life, it is committed
to the maintenance of "the right to differ as to things that touch the
heart of the existing order.' 197 It thus creates "a cleared and safe
space" within which can occur precisely that "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" 198 debate on public issues that one would expect to emerge
when dominant cultural traditions are denied access to the force of
192 Id. (emphasis omitted).
193 M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 150 (1982).
194 See generally Clark, supra note 170, at 314-,5 (discussing the distinction between public
discourse in "primary societies" with a shared identity and secondary societies with economic
and cultural diversity).
195 For an informative catalogue, see Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 69-73
(ig6i) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
196 Michelman makes this same point by noting that public deliberation requires that "par-
ticipation in the process result[j in some shift or adjustment in relevant understandings on the
parts of some (or all) participants." Michelman, supra note 2, at 1526; see also S. BENHABIB,
CRITIQUE, NoRM, AND UTOPIA: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRITICAL THEORY 312-13
(1986).
197 West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
198 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
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law to silence the clash of divergent perspectives. Contemporary
constitutional doctrine looks to this debate to constitute that "universe
of discourse" within which public opinion, and hence democratic pol-
icy, may be formed.
To more fully understand that doctrine, however, the notion of
"critical interaction" upon which it depends must be analyzed some-
what more precisely.
C. The Nature of Critical Interaction Within Public Discourse
The general idea of critical interaction is simple enough. Public
discussion must facilitate communication among persons from widely
varying traditions and cultures. Within public discourse, therefore,
"the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor"; 19 9
"one man's vulgarity is another's lyric";20 0 and "one man's amusement,
teaches another's doctrine."20 1 In such circumstances participants in
public debate must be tolerant; they cannot silence speech because of
pre-existing assumptions about what is reasonable or appropriate, for
any such assumptions would prejudge the outcome and conduct of
the debate.
At root, therefore, the concept of critical interaction depends upon
the continuous possibility of transcending what is taken for granted.
If, as the torts of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress suggest, speech within a community is ordinarily bounded by
normative standards whose validity is assumed and enforced, critical
interaction may be defined as that in which such standards have
ceased to provide boundaries because they have themselves become
potentially questionable. The first amendment embodies this concep-
tion of critical discourse by performing the wholly negative function
of shielding speakers from the enforcement of community standards.
When the standards to be suspended are civility rules, however,
constitutional intervention can be quite problematic, for the obser-
vance of civility rules sustains and defines the very personalities of
those within a community. For this reason, words that are deeply
uncivil "by their very utterance inflict injury,"20 2 and, as Alexander
Bickel once remarked, such communication "amounts to almost phys-
ical aggression. '20 3 We might say, therefore, that civility rules that
distinguish appropriate from inappropriate ways of speaking also tend
199 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940); see Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327
U.S. 146, 158 (1946).
200 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. i, 25 (197i).
201 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 5Io (1948); see Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15,
40-41 (i973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
202 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
203 A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 72 (1975); see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 496 (1970).
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to define a point (although certainly not the only point) at which
speech shades into conduct, at which a community subordinates
speech to the regulatory schemes that it imposes upon action gener-
ally.204 This is explicitly true with respect to the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, which enforces a standard that makes
no distinction at all between speech and conduct; but it is also char-
acteristically true of the other dignitary torts, which carry the strong
sense of a defendant having used "words as instruments of aggression
and personal assault. '205 For this reason the prohibition of the en-
forcement of civility rules is experienced less like the opening to debate
of heretofore unquestionable topics, and more like the licensing of
heretofore unacceptable patterns of behavior.
This fact has important consequences for the constitutional concept
of public discourse, for the ultimate purpose of that discourse is to
enable the formation of a genuine and uncoerced public opinion in a
culturally heterogeneous society. The most complete contemporary
investigation of this purpose appears in the work of Jiirgen Habermas,
who views the public as a "sphere" that grounds the legitimacy of
modern states by providing a space for the creation of "a common
will, communicatively shaped and discursively clarified." 20 6 The ob-
jective is the attainment of "a consensus arrived at communicatively
in the public sphere." 20 7 But such a consensus will carry legitimacy
only if the state imposes upon public discussion the regulative struc-
ture of an "ideal speech situation," in which speech is "immunized
against repression" and "all force" is excluded, "except the force of the
better argument. ' 208 Within an ideal speech situation, discourse is
seen as functioning as pure communication, as "removed from contexts
of experience and action" and as consisting entirely of "bracketed
validity claims of assertions, recommendations, or warnings." 20 9
The radical implication of this perspective is that within the public
sphere the state must regard speech as independent from the general
204 1 am building here on J.L. Austin's insight that the difference between speech and action
is "usually, at least in part, a matter of convention." J. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 237
(3d ed. i979); see id. at 245-47, 251.
205 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 412 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting). A striking example
of a related phenomenon appears in the current pornography controversy, where some com-
mentators have claimed that "[plornography is not expression depicting the subordination of
women, but is the practice of subordination itself." Brest & Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism,
and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607,
659 (1987) (emphasis omitted).
206 2 J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION S1-82 (T. McCarthy trans.
1987).
207 Id. at 82.
208 1 Id. at 25-26 (T. McCarthy trans. 1984). See generally S. BENHABIB, supra note 196,
at 282-83 (discussing Habermas' theory of communicative ethics).
209 J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 107 (T. McCarthy trans. 1975).
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context in which social action is routinely assessed. This means that
many of the criteria for the evaluation of speech which ultimately
derive from that context must be "bracketed" out. As Alvin Gouldner
notes, the "rationality of 'public' discourse . . . depends on the prior
possibility of separating speakers from their normal powers and priv-
ileges in the larger society, especially in the class system, and on
successfully defining these powers and privileges as irrelevant to the
quality of their discourse." 210
All speech, of course, is simultaneously communication and social
action, 211 and in everyday life it is quite difficult and unusual to
separate these two aspects of speech. In most circumstances we attend
as carefully to the social status of a speaker, and to the social context
of her words, as we do to the bare content of her communication. 212
We thus cannot understand Habermas and Gouldner's characterization
of discussion within the public sphere as descriptive. It must be
understood rather as articulating a regulative ideal for the legal struc-
ture of public discourse. This ideal is reflected, for example, in the
first amendment right to engage in public discourse anonymously, so
that speakers can divorce their speech from the social contextualization
which knowledge of their identities would necessarily create in the
minds of their audience. 213
At first glance, therefore, the aspiration of public discourse towards
a condition of "deliberation and reflection and a critical spirit"214
appears to complement the structure of critical interaction, which also
210 A. GOULDNER, supra note 18i, at 98.
211 "Words," as Wittgenstein reminds us, "are deeds." L. WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND
VALUE 46e (P. Winch trans. 198o).
212 See Riesman, supra note 152, at r3o6-07.
213 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 6o (196o). Talley concerned a Los Angeles ordinance
requiring those who distributed hand-bills to identify both themselves and the hand-bills' authors.
The holding is sometimes read as narrowly resting on the need to avoid "the deterrent effect on
free speech" that a general requirement of identification would create. See id. at 67 (Harlan,
J., concurring). But the ordinance at issue in Talley was struck down on its face, and, as Justice
Clark pointed out in dissent:
The record is barren of any claim, much less proof, that [Talley] will suffer any injury
whatever by identifying the handbill with his name. . . . [T]here is neither allegation
nor proof that Talley or any group sponsoring him would suffer "economic reprisal, loss
of employment, threat of physical coercion [or] other manifestations of public hostility."
Id. at 69 (Clark, J., dissenting) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).
The breadth of Talley's holding is therefore better justified by the principle discussed in the
text - the same principle that causes prestigious scientific journals to circulate proposed articles
anonymously for peer review. The hope is that by withholding the identity of the manuscript's
author, journals will obtain an impartial evaluation of the contents of the article, rather than a
reflection of the status of its author.
214 E. DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 89 (C. Brookfield trans. 1957).
For Durkheim, the more democratic the government, the "greater [the] number of things . . .
submitted to collective debate," a debate which must be "dominated by reflection" and lead to
a "shedding [of] custom and tradition." Id. at 87-88.
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regulates speech as pure communication that is severed from its social
context. But on closer inspection this compatibility dissolves, for our
conception of rational reflection and deliberation itself depends upon
the observance of civility rules. Speech inconsistent with these rules
is easily seen as irrational or valueless, 215 as the condescending disgust
aroused in some readers by Hustler's Campari parody illustrates. 216
More importantly, speech inconsistent with civility rules is likely to
be experienced as violent and coercive.2 17 John Dewey made this
point in the very terms in which he expressed his
democratic faith ... in the possibility of conducting disputes, contro-
versies, and conflicts as cooperative undertakings in which both parties
learn by giving the other a chance to express itself, instead of having
one party conquer by forceful suppression of the other - a suppression
which is not the less one of violence when it takes place by psychol-
ogical means of ridicule, abuse, intimidation, instead of by overt
imprisonment or in concentration camps. 218
215 This tendency is evident in the otherwise inexplicable arguments of Frederick Schauer
and others that obscenity "is more accurately treated as a physical rather than a mental
experience" because it contains "neither propositional, emotive, nor artistic content." F.
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 182-83 (1982); see E. BARENDT, FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH 248 (1985); Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, x986 DUKE L.J.
589, 603. For examples in the judicial literature, see Texas v. Johnson, 1o9 S. Ct. 2533, 2553
(1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
216 For an illustrative reaction, see Fein, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell: A Mislitigated and
Misreasoned Case (Book Review), 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 905, 91o (1989) (arguing that the
parody lacks "any plausible nexus to cerebral activity").
217 This experience has already led at least one commentator strongly to criticize the conclu-
sions of the Falwell opinion:
This analogy between intentional infliction of emotional distress and the tort of battery
impeaches the constitutional logic of Hustler at its deepest level. Most of us would be
reluctant to ever categorize any punch or kick as "speech" within the meaning of the first
amendment .... [E]ven though . . .the punch may be a reaction or a "response" to a
political speech with which one heatedly disagrees....
But if a punch . . . does not amount to speech in the constitutional sense, why must
"written speech" be treated as speech within the meaning of the Constitution if the
"written speech" is nothing more than a surrogate for the punch?
Wright, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell and the Role of the First Amendment, ig CuMB. L. REv.
19, 23 (1988). Speech that is experienced as "nothing more than a surrogate for [a] punch" by
virtue of its violation of civility rules cannot be, in Michelman's terms, truly "jurisgenerative."
See Michelman, supra note 2, at 1502.
218 Dewey, supra note i6o, at 393. Dewey's belief in the necessity of civility reflects an
unresolved tension in his thought. Dewey habitually contrasted "the democratic method of
forming opinions in political matters," by which he meant "persuasion through public discussion,"
with what he called "the methods in common use in forming beliefs in other subjects," by which
he meant dependence "upon a person or group possessed of 'authority.'" J. DEwEY, FREEDOM
AND CULTURE 128-29 (1939). Dewey believed that "the usual procedure" of settling "issues,
intellectual and moral, by appeal to the 'authority' of parent, teacher, or textbook" was deeply
"inconsistent with the democratic method." Id. at 129. Yet he never questioned how, in the
absence of some form of social "authority," participants in democratic processes could define,
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The dependence of rational deliberation upon rules of civility sug-
gests that we must understand rational reflection as itself a form of
social action that depends for its fulfillment upon a specific normative
structure. 219 Public discourse consequently entails two distinct and
incompatible requirements. There is, first, the requirement of nega-
tivity, of freedom from the boundaries of community expectations and
norms. This requirement initiates the very possibility of public dis-
course by distinguishing it as pure communication able to reach out
beyond the confines of any single community. This is the requirement
of critical interaction. But there must also be a second requirement,
one of rational deliberation, which entails consideration and evalua-
tion of the various positions made possible by the space of critical
interaction. The constitutional purpose of public discourse requires
that rational deliberation be civil and noncoercive, which is to say
that it must be consistent with the very norms that are negated by
critical interaction.
The two requirements of public discourse thus stand in contradic-
tion. The aspiration to be free from the constraints of existing com-
munity norms (and to attain a consequent condition of pure commu-
nication) is in tension with the aspiration to the social project of
reasoned and noncoercive deliberation. The first aspiration is sus-
tained by the values of neutrality, diversity, and individualism; the
second by the deliberative enterprise of democratic self-governance.
Although the success of public discourse depends upon both require-
ments, the primary commitment of modern first amendment jurispru-
dence has unquestionably been to the radical negativity that charac-
terizes critical interaction, which defines the initial, distinguishing
moment of public discourse. 220 As a consequence the constitutional
structure that regulates the domain of public discourse denies enforce-
ment to the very norms upon which the success of the political enter-
prise of public discourse depends.
This contradiction is deeply disturbing. As Sabina Lovibond has
recently reminded us, "the norms implicit in a community's ... social
practices are 'upheld,' in quite a material sense, by the sanctions which
the community can bring to bear upon deviant individuals." 221 The
inculcate, and sustain the rules of civility that distinguish legitimate persuasion from coercive
"ridicule" and "abuse."
219 See S. BENHABIB, supra note 196, at 316. On the common law's efforts to implement
this insight, see Post, cited above in note I58, at 307-09, 328-29.
220 Thus first amendment doctrine has never embraced the ideal of a civil "town meeting"
that Alexander Meiklejohn took to exemplify public deliberation. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLIT-
ICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 24-26 (1948); see also Post,
supra note 144, at 555-56 (observing that the Supreme Court has rejected Meiklejohn's emphasis
on rules of order and civility in public deliberation).
221 S. LOVIBOND, REALISM AND IMAGINATION IN ETHICS 6i (1983).
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sanctions that the law can bring to bear to support civility rules are
unique, not so much because of their monopoly of physical force, but
because they alone purport to define social norms in accents that are
universal. These norms can, of course, continue to be enforced by
means of private and social pressure. But in the heterogeneity of
contemporary culture only the law can authoritatively speak for norms
that define a common ideal of rational deliberation. Only the law can
rise above the particularity of specific social groups and definitively
articulate those irreducible, minimum constraints of decency whose
violation would be "utterly intolerable in a civilized community."222
To the extent that a constitutional commitment to critical interaction
prevents the law from articulating and sustaining a common respect
for the civility rules that make possible the ideal of rational deliber-
ation, public discourse corrodes the basis of its own existence.
This might be called the "paradox of public discourse."22 3 In
general we have become so accustomed to the paradox that we
scarcely notice it. But it is impossible to avoid in a decision like
Falwell, where the first amendment, in the name of freedom of critical
interaction, blunts rules of civility that define the essence of reason
and dignity within community life. Surely, we tell ourselves, Larry
Flynt's parody cannot be the stuff of rational deliberation; yet the
constitutional protection afforded the parody undercuts our assurance.
In the absence of legal support, our condemnation of the parody, and
the values underlying that condemnation, become somehow relativized
and drained of authority.224 We are left with a conflict between
Flynt's concept of discourse and our own, with no umpire to decide
between us. In this sense a decision like Falwell endangers our hold
on the very concept of rational deliberation.
The intrinsic unease engendered by Falwell is thus explained in
no small degree by the complex dependence of public discourse upon
the very community norms that it negates, and by our queasy appre-
hension that those norms cannot entirely be maintained without the
impersonal authority of law. The Court could have upheld Falwell's
judgment only at the price of denying the premises of critical inter-
action, by subjecting that interaction to "repression" and "force"
222 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1977).
223 The paradox of public discourse, one might say, illustrates the profound truth in Justice
Brandeis' observation that democracy "is a serious undertaking. It substitutes self-restraint for
external restraint. It is more difficult to maintain than to achieve. It demands . .. exigent
obedience to the moral law . . . ." Letter from Justice Louis Brandeis to Henry Bruere (Feb.
25, 1922), quoted in P. STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 192 (1984).
224 See Fein, supra note 216, at gio ("[T]he refusal of the Supreme Court to demarcate a
first amendment line between the Falwell parody and political cartoons suggests a decay in
society's moral convictions.").
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grounded in community values. It could set aside his judgment only
at the price of severing one more thread in the rope that binds
community existence, and hence that may ultimately sustain the very
possibility of rational deliberation. 225 Public discourse requires both
rational deliberation and critical interaction, and the jagged and un-
even course of the Court's precedents involving the regulation of
offensive speech is merely the legal reflection of this deeply disturbing
paradox.
D. The First Amendment, Community, and Public Discourse
First amendment jurisprudence, as has often been noted, contains
many diverse themes. 226 To claim, as I have done, that one important
theme is the separation of public discourse from the regulation of
community norms, is to invite two objections. First, it may be argued
that because the Constitution has been interpreted since the 1930's to
require norms of toleration and individualism, norms which are them-
selves constitutive of a particular kind of community,227 there can be
no coherent distinction between public discourse and community life.
Second, it may be argued (with perhaps some inconsistency) that
because the concept of community is altogether too elusive to be of
analytic value, it is impossible to specify the kinds of norms whose
enforcement within public discourse is prohibited by the first amend-
ment.
Although the premise of the first objection seems to me quite
accurate, its conclusion does not. It is true that we interpret the first
amendment to create a distinct domain of public discourse because
we believe in such values as neutrality, individualism, and diversity.
Our understanding and implementation of these values define the
boundaries of that domain, and for that reason, as I discuss in greater
detail in Part IV, the location of these boundaries must ultimately
depend, at least in part, upon such community values. But within
the boundaries established for public discourse, the first amendment
aspires to suspend legal enforcement of these as well as all other
community values. Thus within the domain of public discourse even
225 This same point is made by those "communitarians," who, like Michael Sandel, argue
that "intolerance flourishes most where forms of life are dislocated, roots unsettled, traditions
undone. In our day, the totalitarian impulse has sprung less from the convictions of confidently
situated selves than from the confusions of atomized, dislocated, frustrated selves, at sea in a
world where common meanings have lost their force." Sandel, supra note io, at 17.
226 See, e.g., Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1212 (x983).
227 See L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986); C. TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE
HUMAN SCIENCES 205-09 (x985).
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the national flag, the very symbol of the values of individualism and
diversity, may be burned and desecrated. 228 The Falwell decision
itself displays this radical negativity by immunizing speech contrary
to norms of rationality, respect, and toleration - the very norms that
justify the creation of our constitutional form of public discourse.
The second objection also begins with a sound premise. Although
the concept of community is "[t]he most fundamental and far-reaching
of sociology's unit-ideas," 229 it is also exceedingly "difficult to de-
fine."1230 In this Article, I define a community as a social formation
that inculcates norms into the very identities of its members. 231 But
this understanding is vulnerable to the criticism that the inculcation
of shared norms is a matter of degree, that some persons can share
some norms but not others, that even within a community the meaning
and application of shared norms can give rise to debate and disagree-
ment, and so forth. And of course this criticism is perfectly reasonable
and accurate. Taken to its logical extreme, it would seem to dissolve
the notion of community altogether, because we can have no princi-
pled way abstractly to decide at just what point enough norms are
sufficiently specific, inculcated and shared so as to constitute a com-
munity. But the criticism need not be pushed so far, for differences
of degree often become differences of kind. The more damaging thrust
of the criticism, therefore, is that in practice it can be extremely
difficult to distinguish exactly when particular norms are part of a
community life.
This point is well taken. Fortunately, though, it is not fatal to
the dialectic between community and public discourse that animates
first amendment doctrine. In the kind of cases we -are considering,
the first amendment functions primarily as a shield to block the im-
position of those norms that a state has already determined legally to
enforce. The decision to define these norms and to recognize them as
important and widely shared is thus made in the first instance by the
state itself. The precise question for constitutional adjudication in
such circumstances is whether the legal enforcement of the norms is
incompatible with the requirements of public discourse.
This incompatibility can arise for a number of different reasons.
In the kind of cases we are considering, the issue for decision is most
likely to be whether the norms which a state seeks to enforce are
inconsistent with the neutrality essential to public discourse. The
228 See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
229 R. NISBET, THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION 47 (1966).
230 T. BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 5 (1978).
231 See M. SANDEL, supra note 193, at I5o; cf. Royce, The Nature of Community, in CLASSIC
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS, supra note 16o, at 201, 2o8-io (arguing that a community consists
of members whose identities have incorporated shared events of cooperation).
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analysis of such questions does not depend upon whether the norms
at issue in a particular case are in fact sufficiently inculcated or
sufficiently shared so as to constitute an actual community.
The analysis does depend, however, upon whether the norms are
of a kind that, if they were actually socialized into the identities of
persons, would establish a community with a "distinctive shape, [a]
unique identity."232 An important challenge for first amendment ju-
risprudence, therefore, is to distinguish between two kinds of social
standards: those that have the potential to constitute a specific form
of community life, and those that do not. Enforcement of the former,
in contrast to the latter, conflicts with the neutrality of public dis-
course. The distinction between the two, as I shall attempt to dem-
onstrate in the following Part, underlies some of the most important
and otherwise puzzling aspects of the Falwell decision.
mII. PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND THE FALWELL OPINION
The Falwell opinion uses three propositions to define "the world
of debate about public affairs" protected by the first amendment. The
first of these propositions is that "an 'outrageousness' standard" cannot
constitutionally be used to penalize speech because it "would allow a
jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views." 233
The second is that "the First Amendment prohibits" using "bad mo-
tive" as a test for imposing "tort liability . .. in the area of public
debate about public figures." 234 The third is that in public discourse
"[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless," 235 while the "First
Amendment recognizes no such thing as a 'false' idea. 236 In this Part
I argue that each of these propositions can be best understood in the
context of a constitutional prohibition on the enforcement of those
standards that carry the potential to define a particular community
identity.
A. The "Outrageousness" Standard
The "outrageousness" standard rejected by Falwell is a paradig-
matic attempt to use the law to maintain the "boundaries" of a par-
ticular concept of community "identity,"237 for it is designed to penalize
speech that has gone "beyond all possible bounds of decency" and that
is "to be regarded as . . .utterly intolerable in a civilized commu-
nity. "238 Legal enforcement of an outrageousness standard would thus
232 K. ERIKSON, supra note 83, at ii.
233 Falwell, 2o8 S. Ct. at 882.
234 Id. at 881.
235 Id. at 880.
236 Id. at 879 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 48 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)).
237 See id.
238 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1977).
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confine public discourse within the "bounds" of the particular "civilized
community" defined by the standard. It would deprive public dis-
course of a position of neutrality as among differing definitions of
community identity.
The Falwell opinion justifies its rejection of an "outrageousness"
standard on the grounds of "our longstanding refusal to allow damages
to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse
emotional impact on the audience." 239 The three dignitary torts are
the primary means by which the law awards damages to protect the
"personality" of individuals from emotional harm caused by speech.
These torts penalize speech that violates civility rules on the theory
that the observance of such rules is necessary for the emotional well-
being of properly socialized individuals. 240 But these same civility
rules concomitantly establish the identity of a community as "civi-
lized," in exactly the same manner as does the outrageousness standard
at issue in Falwell. The "longstanding refusal" to which the Court
specifically refers thus functions as a continuing effort to exempt public
discourse from the enforcement of those kinds of norms commonly
used to create community identity.
Falwell illustrates the depth of the Court's commitment to pre-
serving the neutrality of public discourse from the imposition of these
kinds of norms. Although the Court assumed that the Hustler parody
would "doubtless [be] gross and repugnant in the eyes of most,"24 1 it
nevertheless refused to permit the parody to be penalized. This result
comports with the reasoning of Cantwell: if public discourse is con-
stitutionally protected because it is the medium for the formation of
future communities, its structural independence from all civility rules
must be guaranteed, even if such rules in fact are accepted by every
contemporary community. The "marketplace of communities" must
thus be understood as extending in time, as well as in space. The
individualist methodology of first amendment doctrine ultimately
means that individuals must be free within public discourse from the
enforcement of all civility rules, so as to be able to advocate and to
exemplify the creation of new forms of communal life in their speech.
B. The Distinction Between Speech and Its Motivation
Falwell's rejection of the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit rests
squarely on the premise that in public discourse the worth of speech
cannot be measured by the integrity of its motivation. The opinion
reaches the strong conclusion that, while "bad motive may be deemed
controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, we
239 Falwell, Io8 S. Ct. at 882.
240 See supra pp. 616-24.
241 o8 S. Ct. at 879.
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think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of
public debate about public figures. '242
The reasoning of the Falwell opinion eems at first glance consis-
tent with traditional first amendment doctrine. Since New York
Times, the Court has repeatedly insisted upon this separation of speech
from intent, holding that even false defamatory speech uttered "'from
personal spite, ill will or a desire to injure"'243 does not lose its
constitutional protection. This separation is remarkable, for in ordi-
nary life our assessment of the meaning and value of speech often
depends upon our understanding of the purposes or intentions of a
speaker. 244
The justification for this separation in the context of the Falwell
decision should by now be plain enough. The intent element of the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress effectuates a civility
rule concerning how persons should relate to each other. To use
speech for the primary purpose of emotionally injuring another is to
act in an uncivil way and hence to bring one's conduct within the
regulation of a dignitary tort. Because it enforces a civility rule, the
intent element at issue in Falwell maintains a particular vision of
community life, and so is inconsistent with the neutrality necessary
for public discourse.
This reasoning does not imply, however, that intent can never
constitutionally be used to regulate public discourse, and any such
implication in Falwell is plainly false. The actual malice standard of
New York Times, for example, which Falwell itself applies, permits
false defamatory speech to be punished if there is "sufficient evidence
242 Id. at 88I.
243 Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 8i, 82 (1967) (per curiam) (quoting from
trial court's jury instructions); see also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,
109 S. Ct. 2678, 2685 (1989); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, lo (i97o);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964).
244 See, e.g., K. BuRKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES (1945).
Aristotle noted long ago that the ability of speech to persuade depends to a significant degree
upon our perception of "the personal character of the speaker," II THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 2155 (J. Barnes ed. 1984), which in turn depends in large measure upon our
conviction that he entertains "the right feelings towards his hearers." Id. at 2z94. "Persuasion
is achieved," said Aristotle, "by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken
as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than
others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty
is impossible and opinions are divided." Id. at 2155. A speaker's presentation of character
"may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses." Id.
Motive has such obvious importance for the evaluation of speech that in most areas of the
law we would not dream of severing speech from the context of its purposes or intentions. See,
e.g., United States v. American Livestock Comm'n Co., 279 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1929) (Holmes,
J.) ("[MKotive may not be very material when it is sought to justify what until justified is a
wrong."). Think, for example, of areas like fraud or perjury, where the legal assessment of
speech depends directly upon its intent.
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to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication." 245  The standard thus
ultimately turns on the "state of mind of the defendant. 246 It cannot
be true, therefore, that the "First Amendment prohibits" 247 bad motive
from "controlling" the legal characterization of speech within public
discourse.
The reason the use of an intent requirement is constitutionally
impermissible in the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
but constitutionally acceptable in the actual malice standard, is that
the latter does not use the criterion of intent to enforce a civility rule.
In explicating the actual malice standard the Court has consistently
stressed that the criterion of intent is not to be confused with morally
charged notions like "personal spite, ill will or a desire to injure. '248
Indeed, the fundamental mistake of the Fourth Circuit in Falwell was
to conflate the actual malice standard with the ethical concept of
"culpability. "249 The purpose of the actual malice standard is not to
demarcate any such "boundary between morally acceptable and un-
acceptable modes of political discussion"; 250 it is rather to forge "an
instrument of policy, to attain the specific end of minimizing the chill
on legitimate speech."'25 ' The element of intent in the actual malice
standard accomplishes this objective by placing a defendant, to the
maximum extent possible, in control of the legality of his own speech.
In the actual malice standard, therefore, the element of intent does
not function to impose the norms of an ideal community, but instead
to achieve a desired policy outcome. Thus the permissibility of reg-
ulating public discourse on the basis of the criterion of intent depends
upon the precise use of the criterion in relation to community norms.
C. The Distinction Between Fact and Opinion
The Falwell decision draws a sharp distinction between the com-
munication of facts within public discourse, which can be subject to
legal supervision for truth or falsity, and the communication of opin-
ions or ideas within public discourse, which is constitutionally im-
munized from such supervision. Although this distinction may be
commonplace, it is also deeply obscure, and it has proved resistant to
245 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (i968).
246 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, i6o (i979).
247 Falwell, io8 S. Ct. at 881.
248 See Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 8i, 82 (x967) (per curiam).
249 See supra p. 611; Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1275 (4th Cir. 1986).
250 Post, supra note 144, at 553.
251 Id.; see LeBel, supra note 70, at 331-32. The Falwell opinion makes this point explicitly
when it states that the use of the New York Times standard "reflects our considered judgment
that such a standard is necessary to give adequate 'breathing space' to the freedoms protected
by the First Amendment." Falwell, io8 S. Ct. at 882.
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most analytic attempts at clarification. This section argues that the
thrust of the distinction can most convincingly be explained by ref-
erence to a constitutionally enforced separation of community norms
and public discourse.
z. Some Contemporary Understandings of the Distinction Between
Fact and Opinion. - For many years, the distinction between fact
and opinion formed the backbone of the fair comment privilege, 252
yet neither courts nor commentators were able to give a principled or
convincing explanation of its theoretical foundations. The words
"'fact' and 'opinion,"' as one writer observed, were "treated as if they
possessed some 'magic quality' of self-elucidation," so that they were
used "primarily" as "vague familiar terms into which one can pour
whatever meaning is desired in order to reach a particular conclu-
sion."253 The confusion intensified after the Court's announcement in
Gertz that defamatory opinion was constitutionally privileged. 254 Al-
though courts recognize that it is "often quite difficult to determine
whether a publication constitutes a statement of fact or statement of
opinion," 255 the absence of any satisfactory theory has left courts
saddled with circular and unhelpful doctrinal tests, like those that
urge judges to "consider all the words used" or "all of the circum-
stances surrounding the statement, including the medium by which
the statement is disseminated and the audience to which it is pub-
lished." 256 Such tests fail to specify in any theoretically useful manner
exactly what a court should look for in the "words" or "medium"
employed.
(a) Rhetorical Hyperbole. - Part of the difficulty that courts face
is that in defamation law the notion of opinion has been confused
with the concept of "rhetorical hyperbole," which, strictly speaking,
has nothing to do with the distinction between fact and opinion.
Modern case law on the subject takes as its point of origin the Su-
preme Court's decision in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Associa-
tion v. Bresler,257 in which a newspaper had reported on negotiations
252 See supra p. 627.
253 Titus, supra note 144, at 12o5-o6.
2S4 For a sampling of modern commentary, see Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the
First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1227-44 (1976); Keeton, Defamation and Freedom
of the Press, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1221 (1976); Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion,
and the First Amendment, 74 CALIF. L. REv. ooi (2986); Note, The Fact-Opinion Determi-
nation in Defamation, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1988); Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in
First Amendment Libel Law: The Need for a Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEO. L.J. 1817 (1984); and
Comment, The Fact/Opinion Distinction: An Analysis of the Subjectivity of Language and Law,
70 MARQ. L. REv. 673 (2987).
255 Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 6x F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir.
198o).
256 Id. at 784.
217 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
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between a city and Bresler, a real estate developer, and had charac-
terized Bresler's negotiating tactics as "blackmail." Bresler sued for
defamation and was awarded damages by the trial court, apparently
on the theory that the articles had "imputed to him the crime of
blackmail. '258 The Court rejected this interpretation of the meaning
of the newspaper's language:
It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who reached the word
"blackmail" in either article would not have understood exactly what
was meant: it was Bresler's public and wholly legal negotiating pro-
posals that were being criticized. No reader could have thought that
either the speakers at the meetings or the newspaper articles reporting
their words were charging Bresler with the commission of a criminal
offense. On the contrary, even the most careless reader must have
perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a
vigorous epithet used by those who considered Bresler's negotiating
position extremely unreasonable. 259
In Bresler, therefore, the Court vigorously seized control over the
interpretation of the meaning of a communication, and definitively
determined that an accusation of "blackmail" did not refer to the
crime of blackmail, but rather to extremely unreasonable behavior.
The Court used the term "rhetorical hyperbole" to signify this gap
between the "literal" meaning of a defendant's words and the Court's
interpretation of their "real" meaning. But having legally determined
the "real" meaning of a communication, a court must still decide
whether that meaning constitutes an assertion of fact or of opinion.
Thus the concept of rhetorical hyperbole, which merely signifies a
legally determinable separation between literal and actual meaning,
concerns an inquiry that logically precedes the question whether any
specific meaning is fact or opinion. Having legally determined the
"real" meaning of a communication, a court must still decide whether
that meaning constitutes an assertion of fact or of opinion.
Unfortunately, however, the Court, in a decision issued on the
same day as Gertz, appeared to link the notion of rhetorical hyperbole
to the kind of "opinion" that Gertz deemed constitutionally privileged.
In Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter
Carriers v. Austin,260 the Court reviewed a libel judgment against a
labor union that had identified three plaintiffs as "scabs," and that
had cited Jack London's famous definition of a scab as "a traitor to
his God, his country, his family and his class. '"261 Although the case
technically turned on the application of federal labor law to local labor
258 Id. at 8.
259 Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).
260 408 U.S. 264 (,974).
261 Id. at 268 (emphasis omitted).
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disputes, the Court went out of its way to cite Gertz and Bresler and
to conclude that the union's publication "cannot be construed as rep-
resentations of fact" because it was "merely rhetorical hyperbole." 262
Ever since Austin there has been an unfortunate tendency to equate
constitutionally protected opinion with rhetorical hyperbole, 263 instead
of inquiring into whether the actual meaning made visible by the
concept of rhetorical hyperbole is fact or opinion.
The confusion of opinion and rhetorical hyperbole is reflected even
in the structure of the Falwell case itself. The jury in the case had
returned a judgment that the Campari parody could not "'reasonably
be understood as describing actual facts about [plaintiff] or actual
events in which [plaintiff] participated.' 264 Everyone involved with
the case, including the Court, assumed from this judgment that the
parody involved an assertion of opinion, rather than fact. But this
conclusion does not follow. 265 The concept of rhetorical hyperbole
requires us to recognize that even if traditions of satiric exaggeration
do not permit us to read the assertions of the Hustler parody literally
to say that Falwell actually had intercourse with his mother in an
outhouse, these assertions can nevertheless be understood to convey a
different message. In his Reply Brief to the Court, Flynt explicitly
stated what he had intended the parody to mean: "that Falwell's
message is 'b.s.' . . . that this formidable public figure's teachings are
nonsense." 266 If a reasonable reader were to agree with Flynt that
the parody conveys this meaning, the precise question would then be
whether this message is opinion or fact.
(b) The Distinction Between Judgments and Preference Expres-
sions. - Any attempt to analyze the constitutional privilege for opin-
ion must distinguish between two very different kinds of statements.
Following the Kantian distinction that we have already discussed,
statements that merely express or describe the "private feelings" of a
262 Id. at 284-86.
263 See, e.g., Palm Beach Newspapers v. Early, 334 So. 2d 5o, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 351 (I977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); Epter, The Clash
of Outrage and the First Amendment: The Protection of Non-Mainstream Opinion, 27 DuQ. L.
REV. 437, 438 n.6 (1989); Note, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell: Laugh or Cry, Public Figures
Must Learn To Live with Satirical Criticism, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 97, 112-13 (1988); Note,
Fact and Opinion After Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilege, 34 RUTGERS
L. REv. 81 (I98I); cf. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and
Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U.L. REv. 923, 929-37 (1985) (discussing rhetorical
hyperbole analysis in libel cases as analogous to the general fact/opinion determination).
264 Falwell, io8 S. Ct. at 878 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at Ci).
26s The point can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose Flynt had written of
Falwell that he "drinks like a fish." A jury could very well conclude that the statement does
not describe an "actual" fact about Falwell, meaning that Falwell could not really be said to
drink as a fish would drink. This conclusion would not imply, however, that the figurative
meaning of Flynt's statement, that Falwell is an alcoholic, is not a statement of fact.
266 Reply Brief of Petitioner at 20, Falwell (No. 86-1278).
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speaker must be distinguished from statements which make judgments
about aspects of the world independent of a speaker. 267 The first kind
of statements, which I shall call "preference expressions," are a kind
of report on the inner condition of a speaker, and the only possible
claim to truth they might contain lies in the factual accuracy of that
report. The sentence "I don't like Jerry Falwell" is an example of a
preference expression. Although the sentence does claim to be true,
this claim is at most limited to the validity of its factual characteri-
zation of the subject of the pronoun "I."268 The second kind of
statements, which I shall call "judgments," do not simply make known
the private feelings or attitudes of a speaker, but rather make claims
about aspects of the world that are independent of the speaker and
that do not appear to be merely factual in nature. The sentence "Jerry
Falwell is a hypocrite" is an example of a judgment. The claim of
the sentence to be true does not turn on the attributes of its speaker,
and we intuitively understand the claim to involve evaluation rather
than merely factual description.
At common law, preference expressions rarely formed the basis for
defamation actions. "Terms of abuse and opprobrium" that "had no
real meaning except to indicate that the individual who used them
was under a strong emotional feeling of dislike toward those about
whom he used them," were traditionally viewed as "not of themselves
actionable as libelous." 269 For this reason the vast majority of defa-
mation cases that privilege communications as opinion concern judg-
ments. The Campari parody in Falwell, for example, conveys just
such a negative judgment on Falwell's "teachings."
The distinction between preference expressions and judgments
forces us to understand the opinion privilege invoked by the Falwell
decision in a deeper way. The decision distinguishes "[f]alse state-
ments of fact," which are "particularly valueless," from statements of
opinion. 270 The latter are privileged to protect "the truth-seeking
function of the marketplace of ideas": 271 because "'the best test of
267 See supra p. 625. I am grateful to Bernard Williams for his efforts to help me clarify
this distinction.
268 Some preference expressions, like crude racial insults, may merely evince or express,
rather than describe, private feelings. Strictly speaking, such preference expressions have no
propositional content at all, and thus cannot be said to be either true or false. The existence
of this category of preference expressions, however, in no way affects the argument of this
section.
269 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 1966); see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment e (1977). Some courts, however, have labeled as opinion
assertions that merely reflect a person's "subjective assessment of [a] situation." Fleming v.
Benzaquin, 390 Mass. 175, 185, 454 N.E.2d 95, 102 (1983); see also Johnson v. Delta Democrat
Publishing Co., 531 So. 2d 8i (Miss. 1988).
270 Falwell, xo8 S. Ct. at 88o.
271 Id.
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truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market,"' the "First Amendment recognizes no such
thing as a 'false' idea. '272
This rationale justifies privileging judgments, which make nonfac-
tual truth claims about the world that can be the subject of discussion
and criticism. But it cannot justify privileging preference expressions,
which make only factual truth claims that can in no way constitute a
marketplace of ideas. If preference expressions are to be constitution-
ally privileged, therefore, it must be on the basis of a very different
theory than that proposed in Falwell.
Such a theory could no doubt be developed from conceptions of
individual autonomy and conscience. 273 My only point here, however,
is that the consequences of such a theory would be quite different
from one that turns on the specific properties of public discussion.
The implications of an autonomy theory might be tested by evaluating
the first amendment protection that ought to be extended to defendants
who are sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress because
of preference expressions consisting of crude and offensive racial in-
suits. 2 74 But because preference expressions represent a special and
marginal case, I discuss in the remainder of this Article the constitu-
tional privilege for judgments, and I use the terms "opinions" and
"ideas" to refer exclusively to judgments.2 75
(c) Subjectivity. - It is clear that the justification for the consti-
tutional privilege accorded to judgments cannot be, as is sometimes
asserted in the literature, that opinions are idiosyncratic and
subjective 276 and hence incapable of being "characterized as true or
false."2 77- If judgments could not be said to be either true or false,
272 Id. at 879 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
273 Pertinent here would be those theories of freedom of expression that emphasize the
importance of speech for self-realization and self-fulfillment. For a recent discussion of these
theories, see Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 54, 79-81 (i989).
274 For a collection of such cases, see Richardson, Racism: A Tort of Outrage, 6x OR. L.
REV. 267 (1982). At least one court has upheld such an action brought by a public official.
See Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 638 P.2d 423 (1981).
27S In so doing, I ignore yet a third kind of statement that courts sometimes classify under
the rubric of opinion. John Searle calls them "fictional statements," and notes that they are
"made possible by the existence of a set of conventions which suspend the normal operation of
the rules relating illocutionary acts and the world." J. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING 67
(1979). Fictional statements do not refer (in the ordinary sense) to the world at all, and are
therefore not "about" anyone or anything. As a legal matter, the claim that statements are
fictional and hence not actionable in defamation should depend upon whether the statements
are "of and concerning" the plaintiff. Some courts, however, have incorrectly conceptualized
the problem of fictional statements as an issue of opinion. See, e.g., Pring v. Penthouse Int'l,
695 F.2d 438 (ioth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
276 See Lewis v. Time, Inc., 71o F.2d 549, 554-56 (9th Cir. 1983).
277 Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25
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the marketplace of ideas could not serve a "truth-seeking function,"
and the Court's whole constitutional rationale for protecting opinion
would collapse.
The distinction between judgments and preference expressions sug-
gests, moreover, that in ordinary experience judgments do not at all
seem to involve merely personal or subjective assertions. In everyday
life we make the most momentous decisions on the basis of our
evaluation of the truth or falsity of judgments, whether such judg-
ments occur in a doctor's medical diagnosis or in the grades of a
school transcript or in a memorandum of legal advice. In many areas
of the law, like legal and medical malpractice, the state freely predi-
cates civil sanctions on the basis of its evaluation of the truth or falsity
of opinions. 278 It could not do so if judgments were intrinsically
subjective and incapable of being characterized as true or false.
(d) Verifiability. - The theory that has most influenced courts
concerning the distinction between fact and opinion is the notion that
an opinion is an assertion that "does not lend itself to verification and
cannot, therefore, be regarded as one of fact. '279 Opinions are thus
those statements that cannot be "proved true or false."280 Simply
stated in this fashion, however, the theory is subject to two fatal
objections. First, the definition of opinion as unverifiable statements
renders meaningless the constitutional rationale for protecting opinion.
"The competition of the market" could not in any sense determine the
validity of intrinsically unprovable statements, and hence, a market-
place in such statements could not serve a valuable "truth-seeking
function."
Second, there are statements which, although unverifiable, would
commonly be recognized as statements of facts. For example, if I
were to claim that the temperature at a certain spot in Antarctica
were minus ioo degrees at 2:oo pm on October 17, 1497, the claim
might be unverifiable because of the absence of data or evidence, yet
it would be apparent to all that I was making a factual assertion. 281
WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 868-8o (1984); see Smolla, supra note 8, at 450. For an example
of a decision alluding to this approach, see Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219,
227-29 (2d Cir. 1985).
278 See, e.g., W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at i85-89 (5th ed. 1984).
279 Immuno, A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 145 A.D.2d 114, 143, 537 N.Y.S.2d 129, 147 (,989).
280 Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 229; see, e.g., Janklow v. Newsweek, 788 F.2d 1300, 1302-03
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 778 F.2d
711, 718 (iith Cir. 1985); Ollman v. Evans, 75o F.2d 970, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
281 The existence of such unproveable factual statements was the premise of the Court's
discussion in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), in which the Court
pondered whether plaintiffs or defendants should bear the burden of proving the falsity of
defamatory statements of fact when the speech at issue involved matters of public concern. All
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There is, however, a more sophisticated formulation of the verifi-
ability test that asks not whether statements are verifiable, but
whether they are "objectively"28 2 verifiable, whether they are "subject
to empirical proof."283 This formulation of the test offers two signif-
icant advantages. First, it shifts the focus of analysis away from the
issue of whether a particular statement can be proved, and to the
question of how it can be proved. The latter question requires us to
understand the particular kind of claim contained in a statement.
Second, it offers a rough typology of two potential modes of "verifi-
cation": the truth of some statements can be "empirically" or "objec-
tively" established, but the validity of others can only be determined
by the unimpeded discussion characteristic of the "marketplace of
ideas."
Of course this version of the test cannot work unless we can
establish some intelligible meanings for words like "empirically" or
"objectively." These words are not self-defining, and in proposing
definitions we need to keep in mind the purpose of the enterprise.
"False statements of fact" are constitutionally valueless, the Court in
Falwell tells us, because "they interfere with the truth-seeking function
of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual's
reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however
persuasive or effective." 28 4 The Court's point may perhaps be fairly
generalized in the following manner: for constitutional purposes the
truth of certain kinds of statements - opinions - can only be deter-
mined by the free play of speech and counterspeech characteristic of
the marketplace of ideas. But the functioning of the marketplace
depends upon the accuracy of other kinds, of statements - factual
assertions - whose truth must be determined independently of any
mere process of discussion.
The difficulty with this interpretation of the Court's analysis is
that it appears to conceive of factual truth as independent of social
processes of discussion and communication. This conception conjures
up images of a long-discredited logical empiricism, in which the "ver-
ification" of facts was said to rest on "'brute data' . . . whose validity
cannot be questioned by offering another interpretation or reading,"
members of the Court agreed that the case posed the question of who should bear the risk that
certain statements of fact might be "unknowably true or false." Id. at 776 (emphasis added);
see also id. at 785 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although the Court held that plaintiffs would in
such circumstances be constitutionally required to prove falsity, it fully conceded that its holding
would "insulate from liability some speech that is false, but unprovably so," and hence defeat
suits that were, "in some abstract sense, . . . meritorious." See 475 U.S. at 776. This reasoning
would make no sense whatever if speech were constitutionally privileged as opinion merely
because it was unprovable.
282 See Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 229; Oilman, 750 F.2d at 981; Hollander v. Clayton, x6
Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1447, 1448 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
283 Keller, 778 F.2d at 718 (emphasis added).
284 Falwel, io8 S. Ct. at 880.
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and "whose credibility cannot be founded or undetermined by further
reasoning."285 It is no doubt to these images that judicial use of the
words "empirically" and "objectively" is meant to refer. But the vul-
nerability of such crude empiricism is now more or less taken for
granted, because even if there were such things as "brute data," the
meaning of those data would necessarily depend upon processes of
inference that themselves are susceptible to further interpretation or
reasoning. 286 All knowledge, therefore, ultimately depends, to one
degree or another, upon social processes of discussion. 287
2. Toward a Reformulation of the Distinction Between Fact and
Opinion. - It is possible, however, to make sense of the Court's
analysis if it is reformulated to take account of "the accepted contrast
between" statements "which are expected to be highly diverse, and
which are not expected and which are not required, to converge on
the one hand," and statements "where there is a well established
expectation of convergence" on the other. 288 In the area of "scientific
enquiry," for example, "there should ideally be convergence on an
answer, where the best explanation of that convergence involves the
idea that the answer represents how things are, whereas in the area
of the ethical . . . there is no such coherent hope." 28 9
We expect scientific hypotheses ultimately to converge on a single
answer because such hypotheses, in the words of Gilbert Harman, are
"tested against the world, '290 and the world exists independently of
our perceptions of it. This abstract appeal to a "world" affects only
the kind of claims we understand scientific statements to make; it
does not affect the substance of those claims by naive reliance upon
"brute data." Thus we recognize a claim as scientific if it purports to
describe something independent of scientific investigators in such a
way that, given enough time and effort, we would expect the claim
to be confirmed or disconfirmed by a consensus of investigators. The
origins of this way of thinking go back to the work of Charles Peirce,
who defined scientific truth as the "opinion which is fated to be
285 C. TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 19 (1985).
286 "Observations are always 'theory laden.'" G. HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY 4
(1977).
287 This dependence was the basis of Wigmore's dissatisfaction with the fact-opinion distinc-
tion in evidence law. See 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § I919, at 14-16 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed.
1978); see also Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. 439, 449 (1988); Slovenko, The
Opinion Rule and Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. I (1959). This same depen-
dence also underlay some of Frederick Schauer's justly famous critique of the division between
fact and opinion in defamation law. See Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment:
An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REv. 263 (1978).
288 Hampshire, Morality and Convention, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 145, 146 (A.
Sen & B. Williams eds. i982).
289 Williams, The Scientific and the Ethical, in OBJECTIVITY AND CULTURAL DIVERGENCE
209, 212 (S. Brown ed. 1984).
290 G. HARMAN, supra note 286, at 6.
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ultimately agreed to by all who investigate," and who defined reality
as "the object represented in this opinion." 291 For Peirce, reality was
thus "independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but only of
what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it."29 2
If the notion of a "world" allows us to anticipate that scientific
thought will converge on a single description of nature, matters are
very different with regard to ethical thought, which is ultimately "a
matter of belonging to a certain culture,"293 a matter of "the conven-
tions of groups." 294 So long as there are divergent groups or cultures,
we have no special grounds to expect a consensus to emerge about
any particular ethical claim. If I were to argue, for example, that
eating pork or marrying the widow of one's brother were morally
wrong, I would ultimately have to appeal to norms already accepted
within my culture or community. To the extent you did not share
those norms, I would have no particular reason to expect that you
would agree with me. (You may be convinced, of course, but that is
another matter.)2 95 The lack of any "coherent hope" of convergence
in ethical matters, then, is ultimately founded upon the diversity of
groups and cultures.
We can thus distinguish between statements that make claims
whose validity purports to be independent of the standards or per-
spectives of any finite group of persons, and statements that instead
make claims founded upon the "complex of obligations binding us, as
members of a community, to sustain the institutions which provide
structure for our collective life." 296 Judgments are intrinsically state-
ments of the latter sort. That is because "there must be underlying
grounds of judgment which human beings, qua members of a judging
community, share, and which serve to unite in communication even
those who disagree (and who may disagree radically) .... Judgment
implies a community that supplies common grounds or criteria by
which one attempts to decide."2 97 Hence "we require a definition of
community in order to know how the judgment shall proceed. g298
291 C. PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PEIRCE 38 (1955).
292 Id. at 39.
293 Williams, supra note 289, at 220.
294 G. HARMAN, supra note 286, at 113.
295 As Williams stresses, the distinction between convergent and nonconvergent assertions
does not predict whether convergence "will actually occur," but instead
The point of the contrast is that even if [convergence on ethical matters] happens, it will
not be correct to think that it has come about because convergence has been guided by
how things actually are, whereas convergence in the sciences might be explained in that
way if it does happen. This means, among other things, that we understand differently
in the two cases the existence of convergence or, alternatively, its failure to come about.
Williams, supra note 289, at 212.
296 S. LOVIBOND, supra note 221, at 65.
297 R. BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 142-43 (1983) (emphasis in original).
298 Id. at 143.
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Thus there is an important relationship between convergent and
nonconvergent claims, and the first amendment distinction between
public discourse and community. Because the truth or falsity of judg-
ments is determinable only by reference to the standards of a partic-
ular community, any government effort to penalize false judgments in
public discourse would in effect use the force of the state to impose
the standards of a specific community. This would of course violate
the constitutional principle that the arena of public discussion be
neutral as to community standards. It might well be said, therefore,
that from a constitutional point of view the evaluation of such state-
ments must be left to the free play of speech and counterspeech
through which communities compete within public discourse for the
allegiance of individuals.
But because the truth or falsity of statements of fact is in theory
determinable by reference to standards that, as Peirce notes, transcend
all possible communities, government efforts to penalize false state-
ments of fact are in theory consistent with a position of neutrality vis-
a-vis the standards of any particular community. "[T]he independence
of the fact-finder, the witness, and the reporter," as Hannah Arendt
has movingly demonstrated, places them "outside the community to
which we belong and the company of our peers." 299 It is true that
the punishment of false statements of fact appears, at first blush, to
be inconsistent with the requirement of an ideal speech situation that
all force be excluded "except the force of the better argument. '300 But
statements of fact are not arguments, and the very ability to argue
presupposes accurate facts. "Freedom of opinion," as Arendt notes,
"is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed and the facts
themselves are not in dispute. In other words, factual truth informs
political thought .... "301 Thus the integrity of public discourse itself
depends upon factual accuracy, a point to which Falwell itself ap-
pealed. 302
If Peirce is correct, however, the validity of any factual character-
ization of the world ultimately depends upon the convergence of an
infinite number of perspectives. This is because any given perspective
can be biased and reflect only the particular standards of a specific
community. Whenever the state attempts definitively to determine the
truth or falsity of a specific factual statement, it truncates a potentially
infinite process of investigation and therefore runs a significant risk
of inaccuracy.30 3 Thus although legal fact-finding may in theory be
299 H. ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 259-60 (I968).
300 J. HABERMAS, supra note 208, at 25.
301 H. ARENDT, supra note 299, at 238.
302 See Falwell, ro8 S. Ct. at 88o; see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 769 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
303 Thus, for example, we would certainly rather trust the verdict of indefinite generations
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neutral, in practice we can expect it to be often inaccurate and in-
appropriately influenced by particular community sentiment and prej-
udice. Any respectable first amendment theory should allow for this
phenomenon, and it is no doubt part of the underlying explanation of
why the Court in Falwell did not permit liability to be imposed for
false statements of fact simpliciter, but instead imposed the additional
requirement of "actual malice," so as "to give adequate 'breathing
space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment."s3°4
We can thus advance a rough justification for the position adopted
in Falwell that false statements of fact have no constitutional value
within public discourse, but that false opinions can only be regulated
by the marketplace of ideas. The justification depends upon refor-
mulating the constitutional distinction between fact and opinion in the
following manner: statements of fact make claims about an indepen-
dent world, the validity of which are in theory determinable without
reference to the standards of any given community, and about which
we therefore have a right to expect ultimate convergence or consensus.
Statements of opinion, on the other hand, make claims about an
independent world the validity of which depends upon the standards
or conventions of a particular community, and about which we there-
fore cannot expect convergence under conditions of cultural hetero-
geneity.30 5 If this reformulation is correct, it implies that Falwell's
distinction between fact and opinion stems from the same central first
amendment concern as that which guided Falwell's other characteri-
zations of public discourse: the preservation of the neutrality of public
discourse from the domination of community mores.
of historians than the verdict of any given jury on such questions as whether General William
Westmoreland gave orders to his intelligence officers to underestimate enemy troop strength
during the Vietnam War, or whether Ariel Sharon actually discussed with the Gemayel family
the need to take revenge against Palestinians. See Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Westmoreland v. CBS, 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
304 Falwell, lo8 S. Ct. at 882. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Any nation which counts the Scopes trial as part
of its heritage cannot so readily expose ideas to sanctions on a jury finding of falsity."). The
actual malice standard thus offers a double margin of protection to defendants. The standard
not only provides a safeguard against the potential distortion and error of the state as a fact
finder, but it also reduces the potential chilling effect on defendants' speech by ceding to them
the maximum possible control over the legality of their own speech.
305 Of course, this distinction can only make sense within a society that has come to see
itself anthropologically, as a distinct culture that could possibly be otherwise. For example, a
culture that viewed ethics as having a "foothold or anchorage in Being, apart from the existence
of actually living minds," would also view ethical claims as convergent and, in that respect, no
different from factual statements. See W. JAMES, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,
in THE WILL To BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN IM-
MORTALITY 184, 197 (1956). The legal interpretation of the fact/opinion distinction will thus
ultimately reflect our understanding of our own culture's separation from nature. Cf. Post, A
Theory of Genre: Romance, Realism, and Moral Reality, 33 AM. Q. 367 (1981) (tracing the
decline of ontologically grounded ethics in America).
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This reformulation enables courts constitutionally to distinguish
fact from opinion by determining the kinds of validity claims made
by particular statements. If a literary critic writes, for example, that
a certain novelist did not deserve the Nobel Prize, the statement makes
sense only by reference to the specific canons of aesthetic judgment
invoked by the critic. Because these canons define a particular group,
the statement should be characterized as opinion. But if the critic
writes that the novelist paid $50,000 to certain Swedish officials, she
makes a claim that any person, regardless of her specific community,
should in theory ultimately come to accept if confronted with the
relevant evidence. For this reason the statement should be regarded
as one of fact.
Sometimes the very same statement can be regarded as either fact
or opinion, depending upon the claim that it is interpreted as making.
For example, if a restaurant reviewer states that the egg rolls at a
Chinese restaurant were "frozen," the statement should be deemed one
of fact if the reviewer is taken to mean that the egg rolls were below
the freezing temperature of water, a reference that in principle should
be confirmable by anyone at all. But if, as is more likely, the reviewer
is taken to mean that anyone who has a proper understanding of the
appropriate temperature for the correct presentation of egg rolls would
consider them unacceptably cool, her statement depends for its validity
upon the standards of proper Chinese cooking, and should be under-
stood as opinion.
The kind of validity claim made by a statement frequently depends
upon the genre of expression within which it is embedded. The
example of the restaurant reviewer demonstrates how in many circum-
stances the internal dynamics of a particular genre will virtually com-
pel a specific interpretation of the validity claim of a statement. 306
This is why courts attempting to apply the fact/opinion distinction
have so often focused their analysis on the "medium" and context of
a communication.
3. The Dimensions of the Constitutional Privilege for Opinion. -
The constitutional logic we have been exploring turns on the specific
characteristics of the "arena of public discussion" established by the
first amendment, and for this reason offers little assistance in deter-
mining whether opinion expressed outside that arena should be con-
stitutionally privileged. Although Gertz was originally interpreted
quite narrowly constitutionally to immunize only opinion on matters
"of public concern, '30 7 the prevailing contemporary interpretation is
306 For a particularly clear example of this process;-see Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 380
Mass. 336, 403 N.E.2d 376 (I98O).
307 Thus Tentative Draft No. 21, issued in April, 1975, modified § 566 of the first Restatement
of Torts to provide:
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion. A
statement of this nature, at least if it is on a matter of public concern, is actionable,
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that Gertz privileges statements of opinion regardless of whether or
not they occur in public discourse. 3°0 Thus it is said that "[o]pinion
is always protected under the first amenldment; in fact, its absolute
protection is one of the most pervasive themes of modern first amend-
ment jurisprudence." 30 9  But if this position is correct, it must be
justified by very different constitutional concerns from those we have
already canvassed.
Falwell is drafted quite narrowly and holds only that nonfactual
ridicule is constitutionally privileged from the tort of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress if the plaintiff is a public figure or public
official, and if the ridicule occurs in "publications such as the one here
at issue."310 These qualifications leave undecided the case where the
ridicule does not occur in public discourse. But if one were to imagine
such a case, as for example if Flynt were to call up Falwell's mother
and ridicule her in the words of the Hustler parody, it seems to me
unimaginable that the ridicule would be constitutionally privileged. 311
It cannot be that Falwell absolutely protects all verbal means of
intentionally inflicting emotional distress, all forms of racial, sexual,
and religious insults, so long as the offending communications do not
contain false factual statements. 312
But if Falwell is not to be read so broadly, it cannot be true that
Gertz absolutely privileges the expression of opinion in both public
however, only if it also expresses, or implies the assertion of, a false and defamatory
fact, which is not known or assumed by both parties to the communication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975) (emphasis added).
The commentary to the new provision struggled with the Gertz dictum:
Supreme Court indications that an expression of opinion cannot be the basis for a
defamation action have involved public communications on matters of public concern.
While it is thus possible that private communications on private matters will be treated
differently, the logic of the constitutional principle would appear to apply to all expressions
of opinion ....
Id. at 8 comment c; see Christie, supra note 98, at 1628-32.
308 Thus in May 1975, the American Law Institute voted to strike the phrase "at least if it
is on a matter of public concern" from § 566, on the ground that the principle of Gertz "applies
straight through" regardless of whether speech is public or private. See 52 ALI PROCEEDINGS
152-55 (1975) (remarks of Dean Wade). For court opinions to this effect, see, for example,
Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975-76 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 71o F.2d 549,
553 (9th Cir. 1983). But see Anton v. St. Louis Suburban Newspapers, Inc., 598 S.W.2d 493,
499 n.9 (Mo. Ct. App. i98o) ("The Restatement interprets Gertz as affording a privilege to
allegedly libelous opinions expressed as to private individuals in private communications. We
reject this interpretation.").
309 Smolla, supra note 8, at 452 (footnote omitted); see Epter, supra note 263, at 442-43.
310 Falwell, io8 S. Ct. at 882.
311 Cf. Halio v. Lurie, I5 A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (ig6i) (refusing to dismiss a tort
cause of action for an offensive letter); Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc. 2d io6, 197 N.Y.S.2d
689 (i96o) (recognizing a tort claim where the defendant sent the plaintiff an obscene photo-
graph).
312 See Smolla, supra note 8, at 471-74.
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and private discourse. 313 This suggests that analysis of the constitu-
tional privilege for opinion must proceed in at least two dimensions.
First, it must ask whether the expression of opinion occurs within
public or private discourse. Second, it must explore the reason or
justification for the regulation of the opinion. Gertz holds, most pre-
cisely, that the state cannot restrict the expression of opinion on the
ground that the opinion is false. One could plausibly maintain that
the state cannot, under any circumstances, penalize opinion because
it is false, but that the constitutionality of regulating opinion for other
reasons, as for example those involved in Falwell, depends (in part)
upon whether the expression occurs within public or private discourse.
This hypothesis, however, requires us to ask why the Constitution
would place a blanket prohibition on the state from finding opinions
true or false, but permit the state to regulate the expression of out-
rageous opinions when they do not occur in public discourse. 314
313 The Court's decisions in the area of commercial speech confirm this conclusion. The
Court has accepted a "'common-sense' distinction between" commercial speech and public dis-
course, and has "afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate
with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values." Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978); see Meyer v. Grant, 1O8 S. Ct. 1886, 1891 (1988);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). Consequently, "when the
particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when
experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose
appropriate restrictions." In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). This scheme of regulation,
which is designed to "provide the legislative and executive branches needed leeway in a field
(commercial speech) 'traditionally subject to governmental regulation,'" Board of Trustees v.
Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3035 (1989) (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56), would be rendered
meaningless if commercial speech could achieve constitutional immunity from state restriction
merely through formulation as opinion.
314 One possible line of reasoning is that the truth or falsity of an opinion turns on its
content, and the first amendment is deeply hostile to content-based regulation. The regulation
of opinion because of its outrageousness, on the other hand, refers to style rather than to
substance and is to that extent content-neutral. Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on this reasoning
in his recent dissent in Texas v. Johnson, 1O9 S. Ct. 2533 (1989), where he argued that the
desecration of the flag conveys "nothing that could not have been conveyed ... just as forcefully
in a dozen different ways." Id. at 2549 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 2557
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
This reasoning, however, is ultimately unsatisfactory. The Constitution is not hostile to the
regulation of false assertions of fact, although such regulation is manifestly content-based. We
must explain, therefore, why in non-public discourse content regulation is permissible with
regard to facts, but not opinions. Moreover the distinction between style and substance is
tenuous and unconvincing: often how something is said determines what is said. See Jones,
Blasphemy, Offensiveness and Law, io BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 129, 142-43 (198o). The difficulties
that translators routinely face in rendering essays, satires, short stories, or poems from one
language into another exemplify this phenomenon. What Shelley famously called "the vanity of
translation" illustrates the extent to which communication resists abstraction as "content" and
instead inheres in the physical form of its presentation. See Shelley, A Defence of Poetry, in
ENGLISH ROMANTIC WRITERS 1072, 1074 (D. Perkins ed. 1967); cf. Brooks, The Heresy of
Paraphrase, in THE WELL WROUGHT URN 176 (1947). Conversely, our evaluation of the style
of a communication is often deeply influenced by its substance. The point can plainly be seen
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To pursue this inquiry, we must focus on the precise way in which
opinions claim to be true or false. Statements of opinion seem to be
inherently debatable and uncertain in a way that statements of fact
do not. No doubt this characteristic of opinion has misled some courts
and commentators into thinking that opinions do not even claim to
be true. But on close inspection the characteristic stems instead from
the fact that the very cultural standards that determine the truth of
opinions are not themselves fixed and determinate, but rather are
subject to debate. If facts appeal for validation to those standards
that would theoretically prevail only after a potentially infinite process
of investigation and discussion, and hence that would obtain only
after all debate is settled, opinions appeal for validation to standards
that are instead local and particular, and hence that remain fully
subject to reinterpretation. The meaning of these latter standards,
moreover, inheres in no small degree in their application to particular
situations. There is no theory, no reproducible method, no "recon-
structible rules"'3 15 by which we can definitively determine whether
any given application, any given opinion, is correct or incorrect,
because every such application will carry within it a contestable un-
derstanding of the underlying standard to be applied. Opinions might
thus be viewed as invitations to join in a process of interpreting
standards. The protection extended to opinion by the common law
privilege of fair comment trades on exactly this understanding. 316
It does not follow that opinions do not claim to be true or do not
solicit agreement on the basis of their truth, but it does follow that
opinions are in their nature debatable. To impose sanctions for "false"
opinions is to use the force of law to end this potential debate by
imposing legally definitive interpretations of the cultural standards at
issue. To the extent that we understand the identity of a society or
community to subsist in the meaning of its standards, the exact ques-
tion posed by the regulation of false opinions is whether that identity
should, so to speak, be left to bubble up through dispersed processes
of communication and deliberation, or whether it should be hegemon-
ically established by legal institutions. The common law crime of
seditious libel explicitly rested upon the latter approach, upon the
notion that, as Lord Holt stated in 1704, "If people should not be
called to account for possessing the people with an ill opinion of the
government, no government can subsist."317 The first amendment's
in the Campari parody at issue in Falwell, which is "outrageous" not merely because of its style,
but also because of its substance.
315 See C. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 20-21 (1987); see also R. BEINER,
supra note 297, at 142-44.
316 Indeed this understanding was the very ratio decidendi of the court in Carr v. Hood,
170 Eng. Rep. 985 n.*, i Camp. 357 n.* (K.B. 18o8), which premised its decision on the need
to avoid "a monopoly of sentiment and opinion." Id.; see supra p. 627.
317 Queen v. Tutchin, 14 Howell's State Trials xo95, 1128 (Q.B. 1704).
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repudiation of seditious libel would appear at first blush to reject this
approach.
The regulation of false statements of fact, on the other hand, poses
a very different question. Although legal determinations of the truth
or falsity of factual statements may pose an inherent risk of error,318
they do not foreclose those processes of deliberation and discussion
through which the identity of a community is forged: as Arendt writes,
"[f]acts are beyond agreement and consent."319 Their truth does not
ultimately depend upon any interpretation of the local and particular
standards of a given community.
The regulation of uncivil opinions also poses a very different ques-
tion. Civility rules do not purport to distinguish true from false
statements, but instead purport to define, in complementary fashion,
community and individual identity. Thus if the state were to punish
an opinion because it was outrageous, there would be no necessary
implication about the truth or falsity of the opinion. Of course in
implementing such a punishment the state would itself be authorita-
tively applying a general cultural norm (the civility rule) to a particular
communicative act (the opinion), and hence to that extent authorita-
tively establishing community identity. But it is one thing for the
state itself to express an authoritative opinion ("The Campari parody
is outrageous"), and it is quite another for it to prohibit others from
expressing such opinions ("Jerry Falwell is outrageous"). 320
The pattern of contemporary first amendment doctrine, which
permits the state to regulate in private discourse false statements of
fact and outrageous opinions, but not false opinions, is thus not
without potential justification. The question, however, is whether the
justification is sufficient. It seems correct to conclude that, at some
point or another, the state must assume responsibility for determina-
tions of factual accuracy, because any other conclusion would lead to
paralysis. The primary constitutional concern should be to calibrate
the ever-present risk of error (the state's, as well as the speaker's) to
the value of maintaining freedom of expression. It also seems correct
to conclude that, at some point or another, the state must be able
authoritatively to construe its own civility/ rules. These rules are
deeply important to the maintenance of community identity, especially
318 See supra pp. 659-60. The law can compensate for this risk of error by various devices,
ranging from the allocation of burdens of proof to the actual malice standard of New York
Times. See supra p. 66o; see also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778
(i986).
319 H. ARENDT, supra note 299, at 241.
320 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2556-57 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The content of respondent's message has no relevance whatsoever to the case."); Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 243-44 (1983) (arguing
that limitations on profanity are restrictions on the manner rather than the content of expression).
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so because they tend to mark the boundaries between speech and
conduct.
But the question of whether the state may ever determine the truth
or falsity of opinions, and hence use force to cut off debate about the
meaning of the cultural standards interpreted by those opinions, seems
much more problematic than the contemporary reading of Gertz would
suggest. There are plainly circumstances in which good reasons exist
for using law in this fashion. To pick a particularly obvious example,
lay persons must often depend upon the opinions of experts, like
lawyers or doctors, and hence as to laypersons these opinions are not
really debatable. It makes sense, therefore, for the law to hold such
experts legally accountable, within a certain range, for the truth or
falsity of their opinions. When the law does this, it is in essence
hegemonically establishing authoritative cultural standards upon
which persons can rely.321
The example of expert opinion illustrates the deeper issue: speech,
and most particularly speech apart from public discourse, belongs to
a dense texture of social action and is therefore often regulated as a
form of action. The Gertz dictum, however, primarily conceives
speech as a vehicle for the communication of ideas and perspectives.
The contemporary interpretation of Gertz radically privileges these
communicative qualities of speech. Speech does of course contain
these qualities, but it also contains in significant respects the attributes
of social action. To regulate speech as action is to fix the social
relations in which persons stand connected to one another; to privilege
speech as a medium of ideas is to create a clear and safe space within
which persons can step back from those relations and reflect upon
them, and so avoid committing themselves to those relations.
There are very good reasons for establishing that space within the
sphere of public discourse. But the matter is considerably more com-
plicated outside of that sphere, for the simple reason that in everyday
life we often want persons to be committed to, and to be held to, the
standards of particular social roles. But if this perspective is correct,
then the blanket application of the Gertz dictum to opinion in non-
public discourse may have been too hasty. We may need instead to
reflect, on a case-by-case basis, on the relative importance of main-
taining the flexibility and open-textured quality of specific cultural
standards.322
321 See Aman, SEC v. Lowe: Professional Regulation and the First Amendment, 1985 Sup.
CT. REV. 93, 93-95.
322 The Court's commercial speech doctrine points heavily in this direction, for it permits
commercial speech, which is not public discourse, to be regulated if it is "misleading" or "more
likely to deceive the public than to inform it." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (ig8o). The doctrine makes no distinction between opinion
and fact.
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IV. DEFINING THE DOMAIN OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE
If the first amendment extends special constitutional protection to
public discourse by insulating it from the enforcement of community
norms, 3 23 it is necessary to distinguish public discourse from other
speech. In contemporary doctrine, however, this distinction is noto-
riously ill-conceived and unreliable. 324 In fact it is commonly accepted
that the Court's efforts in this direction have resulted in a dreadful
mess. 3 25 It is important to assess the causes of this failure, however,
before attempting to hazard any recharacterization of the specific
domain of public discourse. In doing so one must begin with the
observation that contemporary doctrine has attempted to mark the
boundaries of the domain of public discourse in roughly two ways.
The first focuses on the content of speech, the second on the manner
of its dissemination.
A. The Domain of Public Discourse in Contemporary Doctrine
i. The Content of Speech: Matters of Public Concern. - Contem-
porary doctrine delineates the domain of public discourse primarily
through an assessment of the content of speech. The Court has a
standard account of this approach: "We have recognized that the First
Amendment reflects a 'profound national commitment' to the principle
that 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open' and have consistently commented on the central importance of
protecting speech on public issues." 326 As a doctrinal matter, there-
fore, the Court has most comprehensively attempted to define public
discourse by distinguishing speech about "matters of public concern"
from speech about "matters of purely private concern." 327
323 I do not mean to imply, of course, that the first amendment protects only public discourse.
See Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law: The Role of Content, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1657, 1671-
73 (x987).
324 See Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DE PAUL L. REv. 27
(1987). For a more general discussion of the difficulties of the public/private distinction, see
Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. RaV. 1349
(1982).
325 See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 323, at 1657.
326 Boos v. Barry, io8 S. Ct. 1157, x62 (I988) (citations omitted) (quoting New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
327 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (plu-
rality opinion); see Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986). For
about a decade this distinction remained obscure. The Court had reasoned in New York Times
that the first amendment embodies "a profound national commitment" to robust public debate,
see 376 U.S. at 270, in order to assure the "'unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.'" Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (I957)). The Court had thus proposed that speech necessary for
democratic self-governance be immunized from the community civility standards enforced by
the common law tort of defamation, unless a speaker had published false statements of fact
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Although the "public concern" test rests on a clean and superficially
attractive rationale, the Court has offered virtually no analysis to
develop its logic. 328 Indeed, as matters now stand, the test of "public
with "actual malice." See id. at 283. New York Times extended this immunity to criticism of
the "official conduct" of public official plaintiffs, because such criticism was manifestly at the
core of democratic self-governance. See id. at 282. In keeping with this rationale, the Court
soon expanded the application of the actual malice rule to "anything which might touch on an
official's fitness for office," Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964), as well as to the
fitness of candidates for elective public office, see Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,
271-72 (197I). The apogee of this line of analysis was Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (971), which proposed to apply the New York
Times requirement of actual malice to all speech involving matters of "public or general interest."
Id. at 43.
The clarity of this reasoning was obscured in 1974, however, when the Court in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (I974), struck a compromise position which required that the
actual malice standard be applied only if a defamation plaintiff were a "public person," meaning
a public official or a public figure, but which also extended some constitutional protection to all
speech, whether or not it could be characterized as public discourse. See id. at 342, 347. Gertz
held that in the absence of actual malice states could not enforce common law rules regarding
presumptive and punitive damages for defamatory speech, and that the Constitution also re-
quired that plaintiffs prove a defendant is at "fault" before receiving damages. See id. at 347,
349-5o. Although these constitutional restrictions intruded less deeply into the operation of
community civility rules than did the restrictions required by the New York Times actual malice
standard, they were nevertheless quite important. See Post, Foundations of Defamation Law,
supra note 72, at 713-14, 738-39. The rationale for these restrictions was unclear, however,
because to the extent that they applied to speech unrelated to matters of democratic self-
governance, they could not be justified by the same reasoning as that which underlay New York
Times. To date the Court has been unable or unwilling to offer any alternative rationale.
In recent years, therefore, the Court has begun to reformulate the Gertz compromise in such
a way as to make the distinction between public discourse and other speech determinative for
the reach of constitutional restrictions on the enforcement of community civility rules. In Dun
& Bradstreet, for example, the Court reinterpreted Gertz to eliminate any constitutional restraints
on common law rules of presumptive and punitive damages so long as defamatory speech
involves only private plaintiffs and is about "matters of purely private concern." Dun &
Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759-6o (plurality opinion). Although the Court did not expressly discuss
whether it would also remove the constitutional requirement of "fault" in such circumstances,
it nevertheless left the clear implication "that the constitutional requirement of fault in a private
plaintiff defamation case applies only if the subject matter of the defamatory falsehood pertains
to a matter of 'public concern."' Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1988).
In the 1986 decision of Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), the
Court held that where speech "is of public concern" a plaintiff must bear the burden of proving
falsity, even if the plaintiff is a private figure. See id. at 775-76. The Court did not indicate
who would bear this burden if a plaintiff were a private figure and a defendant's speech were
"of exclusively private concern," although the Court did delphically remark that in such circum-
stances "constitutional requirements do not necessarily force any change in at least some of the
features of the common-law landscape." Id. One commentator has concluded that "the logic
of Dun & Bradstreet" would lead to the conclusion that in such circumstances the first amend-
ment would require no change in "the unvarnished rules of the common law." Smolla, supra
note 8, at 471.
328 See Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle To Define Speech on Matters of
Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 75, 8I (1988); Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of
Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 6i S. CAL. L. REv. I, 25-27 (1987).
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concern" "amounts to little more than a message to judges and attor-
neys that no standards are necessary because they will, or should,
know a public concern when they see it."329 To begin to comprehend
the causes for this failure, one must note the ambiguity in the adjective
"public" in the phrase "public concern." Sometimes the adjective
signifies that the speech at issue is about matters that ought to be of
interest to those who practice the art of democratic self-governance.
I shall call this the "normative" conception of public concern. Some-
times, however, the adjective connotes that the speech at issue con-
cerns matters that large numbers of people already know, and thus
are "public" in a purely empirical sense. I shall call this the "descrip-
tive" conception of public concern.
The doctrinal test that the Falwell opinion uses to distinguish
public discourse from other speech hovers equivocally between these
two conceptions of public concern. Under the rule proposed by Fal-
well, which tracks traditional first amendment doctrine in the area of
defamation, the New York Times actual malice standard applies if the
plaintiff is a public figure or a public official. 330 The "public official"
branch of this doctrine flows directly from the normative concept of
public concern, which reflects the core purpose of New York Times to
protect speech about matters pertinent to democratic self-governance.
But the "public figure" branch is ambiguous, half justified by the
notion that speech about public figures is normatively relevant to
democratic self-governance, 331 and half by the notion that speech
about public figures concerns matters of "notoriety" that have, in a
purely descriptive sense, already caught "the public's attention. 332 In
the end, therefore, the public official/public figure test must be justified
by reference to either the normative or descriptive conception of "pub-
lic concern." 333 An understanding of the ills that underlie contem-
329 Langvardt, Public Concern Revisited: A New Role for an Old Doctrine in the Constitu-
tional Law of Defamation, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. 241, 259 (1987).
330 See Falwell, lo8 S. Ct. at 882.
331 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 146-55 (1967) (plurality opinion); id. at 163-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
332 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342. Note, for example, the ambiguity of the Court's characterization
of Jerry Falwell as a "public figure." See Falwell, io8 S. Ct. at 882 & n.5. The Court cited
Who's Who in America to the effect that Falwell "is the host of a nationally syndicated television
show and was the founder and president of a political organization formerly known as the Moral
Majority. He is also the founder of Liberty University in Lynchburg, Virginia, and is the author
of several books and publications." Id. at 882 n.5.
333 The difference between the constitutional protection afforded to speech about public
persons and that afforded to speech of public concern about private persons indicates that the
domain of public discourse is not an undifferentiated terrain. It instead contains different
categories of speech which may receive different forms of constitutional protection. The dis-
tinction between speech about public persons and speech of public concern about private persons
is thus not a distinction between public discourse and other forms of communication, but rather
a difference internal to the domain of public discourse itself. In fact the Court's justification
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porary doctrine must begin with an analysis of each of these two
distinct conceptions of "public concern."
(a) The Normative Conception of "Public Concern." - The Court
is most comfortable with the normative conception of "public con-
cern," and in most instances its use of the phrase signifies that the
content of the speech at issue refers to matters that are substantively
relevant to the processes of democratic self-governance. But it is not
difficult to see why this conception of public concern would lead
directly to a doctrinal impasse. Democratic self-governance posits that
the people, in their capacity as a public, control the agenda of gov-
ernment. They have the power to determine the content of public
issues simply by the direction of their interests. This means that every
issue that can potentially agitate the public is also potentially relevant
to democratic self-governance, and hence potentially of public con-
cern. The normative conception of public concern, insofar as it is
used to exclude speech from public discourse, is thus incompatible
with the very democratic self-governance it seeks to facilitate.
The Court fully recognizes this difficulty. It underlies the Court's
firm and correct conviction that "governments must not be allowed to
choose 'which issues are worth discussing or debating' . . . . To allow
a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate
would be to allow that government control over the search for political
truth."334 It also lies at the root of the Court's initial rejection in
Gertz of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc. ,335 which proposed to apply the New York Times require-
ment of actual malice to all speech involving matters of "public or
general interest. '336 The Court repudiated this proposal because of
its doubts concerning "the wisdom of committing ... to the conscience
of judges" the task of determining "'what information is relevant to
self-government.' 33 7
Certain speech, of course, is clearly and obviously recognizable as
substantively relevant to democratic self-government. Most speech
about public officials falls into this category. But it does not follow
from this fact that speech less easily recognizable can with confidence
for providing greater constitutional protection to speech about "public figures" than to speech
about private figures involving matters of public concern turns almost entirely on considerations
of individual equity, considerations that have little to do with defining and protecting speech
necessary for democratic self-governance. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-46; Branson & Sprague,
The Public Figure-Private Person Dichotomy: A Flight from First Amendment Reality, go DICK.
L. REv. 627, 634-37 (1986).
334 Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (ig8o) (citations
omitted) (quoting Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (972)); see Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 545 (945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
335 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
336 Id. at 43.
337 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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be ruled out as irrelevant to matters of public concern. Robert Bork,
for example, once proposed limiting constitutionally protected speech
to that "concerned with governmental behavior, policy or person-
nel."1338 Bork's proposal was attractive because it seemed to follow so
directly from the logic of democratic self-governance, and to offer a
clean and precise definition of speech about matters of public concern.
On closer inspection, however, Bork's proposal proved inadequate,
because it missed the fundamental point that the first amendment
safeguards public discourse not merely because it informs government
decisionmaking, but also because it enables a culturally heterogeneous
society to forge a common democratic will. The formation of this will
depends upon the ability of public discourse to sustain deliberation
about our identity as a people, as well as about what specifically we
want our government to do. That is why most would unquestionably
consider as public discourse the public discussion of such issues as the
proper role of motherhood, the disaffection of the young, and the
meaning of American citizenship, even if this discussion did not occur
within the specific context of any proposed or actual government
action. 339
The public realm, as Hanna Pitkin has eloquently remarked, is
where the "people determine what they will collectively do, settle how
they will live together, and decide their future, to whatever extent
that is within human power."340 To decide these things, however, is
to engage in a process of "collective self-definition," of determining
"who we shall be, for what we shall stand."'341 To classify speech as
public discourse is, in effect, to deem it relevant to this collective
process of self-definition and decisionmaking. There is obviously no
theoretically neutral way in which this can be done. Speech can be
deemed irrelevant for national self-definition only in the name of a
particular, substantive vision of national identity. If this is done with
the authority of the law, possible options for democratic development
will be foreclosed.
The problem can be illustrated by Samuel Warren's and Louis
Brandeis' famous article The Right to Privacy,342 published in 1890,
which virtually created the common law tort of invasion of privacy. 343
The origins of the article were said to lie in the outrage which Warren,
a genuine Boston Brahmin, felt at newspaper reports of his private
338 Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 27 (1971).
339 Recall, in this context, that Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), itself viewed
debates about "the realm of religious faith" as quintessential public discourse. See id. at 310.
340 Pitlin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 343 (1981).
341 Id. at 346.
342 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (189o).
343 See Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, i9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954) (discussing
the application of the Brandeis privacy conception to the modern era).
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entertainments. 344 Warren and Brandeis argued that such gossip was
not of public concern and that it usurped "the space available for
matters of real interest to the community."345 Yet, in retrospect,
public fascination with the doings of the rich and the aristocratic at
the turn of the century may have played an integral part in the general
movement toward the creation of the welfare state, with its progres-
sive tax and other instruments of wealth redistribution. Although
reports of Samuel Warren's particular dinner parties may well have
lacked significance, they formed part of this much larger process by
which the people, as a public, came to alter their vision of the nation.
In'retrospect, therefore, Warren's and Brandeis' dismissal of such gos-
sip as merely "idle" and as the bearer only of "triviality, '346 has come
to seem an unattractive example of self-serving class prejudice. 347
The fundamental theoretical difficulty faced by writers like Warren
and Brandeis, who would place limits on what ought to be pertinent
to the formation of a common democratic will, is that any effort
substantively to circumscribe public discourse is necessarily self-de-
feating, for it displaces the very democratic processes it seeks to
facilitate.
(b) The Descriptive Conception of "Public Concern." - The de-
scriptive conception of "public concern" promises a way out of this
impasse. It appears to offer courts a means of maintaining the bound-
aries of public discourse in a manner that remains neutral with respect
to the competing claims of speech to be relevant to issues of democratic
governance. The descriptive conception defines "speech involving
matters of public concern" as speech about issues that happen actually
to interest the "public," which is to say to "a significant number of
persons." 348 The conception thus flows from a purely empirical notion
of the public; it classifies as public discourse expression about the
common stimuli that in fact establish the existence of a public. 349
344 See A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1946); D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND
THE PRESS: THE LAw, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 20-25 (1972).
345 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 342, at x96.
346 See id.
347 Don Pember, for example, writes that "[tihe Warren-Brandeis proposal was essentially a
rich man's plea to the press to stop its gossiping and snooping." D. PEMBER, supra note 344,
at 23.
348 B. HENNESSY, PUBLIC OPINION 8-9 (3d ed. 1975).
349 Modern political scientists have in general abandoned the normative definition of the
public characteristic of the sociology of the 193o's, and have instead preferred to investigate the
concept of the public as a purely empirical phenomenon. For examples of this tendency, see
W. BENNETT, PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 12-63 (I980), which adopts a "situa-
tional perspective" that regards the public as "the collection of individuals who actually form
and express opinions on a specific issue at a particular time," id. at 13; and V. KEY, PUBLIC
OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 8-17 (196i), which defines public opinion broadly to
encompass all opinions held by individuals that "governments find it prudent to heed," id. at
[Vol. 1o3:6oi
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The influence of the descriptive conception is visible in the Court's
doctrinal efforts to make constitutional protection depend upon the
"public figure" status of plaintiffs. 350 These efforts have led some
courts to classify speech as public discourse depending upon whether
it is about a plaintiff whom "statistical surveys" indicate enjoys "name
recognition" among "a large percentage of the well-informed citi-
zenry. "351
The attempt to define public discourse in purely descriptive terms,
however, is subject to the powerful objections of being both over- and
underinclusive. The definition is overinclusive because it extends con-
stitutional protection to speech about matters that seem trivial and
irrelevant to democratic self-governance. 352 The definition would clas-
sify as public discourse speech about prominent celebrities, even if
such celebrities have only negligible "involvement in or influence on
public policy matters." 353 Examples such as Johnny Carson or Carol
Burnett come immediately to mind. 354 The definition is underinclu-
sive because it would exclude from public discourse speech about
matters which, although unknown, obviously pertain to the processes
of democratic self-governance. The expos6 of heretofore secret gov-
ernment misconduct, or the discussion of an especially high but as yet
unnoticed rate of teenage suicide, both concern issues that ought to
be well-known, even if they in fact are not; any acceptable definition
of public discourse must include them.
Both objections to the descriptive conception of "public concern"
rest on the assumption that the true touchstone of public discourse
must lie in a substantive evaluation of whether the content of speech
is relevant for self-governance. The argument that the descriptive
conception is overinclusive assumes that speech about matters that
are manifestly irrelevant can be identified in a principled way. The
argument that the definition is underinclusive assumes that speech
about matters that are manifestly relevant can be identified. Therefore
to the extent that these objections carry weight, and they seem to me
very strong, we are brought around full circle and returned to our
initial lack of any principled method of determining what kinds of
issues ought to be excluded from the domain of public discourse.
350 See Franklin, supra note 323, at 1665.
351 Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1295 & n.20 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980); see Harris v. Tomczak, 94 F.R.D. 687 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
3s2 The Court's development of the doctrine of the limited purpose public figure can be read
as a response to this overinclusiveness. The doctrine holds that the mere fact that an individual
is involved in a prominent "public controversy" is not enough to make her into a public figure:
the controversy must be of a certain "sort," of a kind that is related to "'the resolution of public
questions.'" Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455 (1976) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 48 U.S. 323, 351 (i974)).
353 Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 917 (1984).
354 See Branson & Sprague, supra note 333, at 636-37; Franklin, supra note 323, at 1665.
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The descriptive conception of public concern nevertheless retains
a certain appeal, because it focuses attention on the social precondi-
tions for the maintenance of public discourse. One of these precon-
ditions is the exposure of the participants in public deliberation to
common stimuli. 355 Speech about well-known matters concerns the
very stuff that makes public discussion possible. Such speech thus
reinforces and amplifies the bonds of public life. Although speech
about Johnny Carson differs in important ways from speech about
explicit government policy, the ability of the public to deliberate about
government policy depends upon the fund of experience common to
members of the public, and speech about commonly known matters
increases the depth of that experience. Speech about prominent ce-
lebrities may therefore influence in subtle and indirect ways public
deliberation of public policy: it may provide common points of refer-
ence for debate, or crystalize common concerns, or shape common
metaphors of understanding. Learning of a prominent athlete or en-
tertainer's struggles with drugs or alcohol may well lead the public to
a different and perhaps more (or less) sympathetic understanding of
the social problem of substance abuse. Discussion of the World Series
may lead to an altered perception of the national character.
The claim of speech about well-known matters to constitutional
protection as public discourse thus depends on the assumption that
public speech is indivisible, that communication for one purpose, such
as gossip, will influence communication for another, such as self-
government. This assumption underlies that "overwhelming" dialectic
that Harry Kalven once predicted would lead the definition of public
discourse "from public official to government policy to public policy
to matters in the public domain. '"356
But the extent of interdependence among forms of public speech
is an empirical question, and without empirical data all that can be
said is that public discourse will probably be impoverished, to some
unspecifiable degree, whenever the enforcement of community civility
standards diminishes speech about well-known matters. It does not
follow from this that speech about well-known but seemingly trivial
issues must be included within public discourse. But it does counsel
caution in the exclusion of such speech from public discourse, partic-
ularly if, as a normative matter, the content of the speech at issue
cannot definitively be excluded as irrelevant to matters of self-gov-
ernance.
2. The Manner in Which Speech Is Disseminated: Of the Medial
Nonmedia Distinction and Other Conundrums. - If the strand of
355 See supra p. 635.
356 Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 221.
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contemporary doctrine that attempts to define public discourse in
terms of the content of the speech at issue is ultimately inadequate
and self-contradictory, it at least has the advantage of explicit judicial
thematization. The second strand of contemporary doctrine, which
focuses on how speech is disseminated rather than on its content, is
much more obscure, and must be gathered together out of the dark
corners of the Supreme Court's opinions. But although the Court has
not yet attempted to formulate this second strand of doctrine in the
shape of formal rules, its influence on the Court's judgments is never-
theless distinctly visible.
The origin of the phrase "matters of public concern" in first amend-
ment doctrine, for example, lies in the important 194o decision of
Thornhill v. Alabama.35 7 In Thornhill, the Court considered the ques-
tion of whether labor picketing was constitutionally protected expres-
sion. The Court began its analysis with this premise: "The freedom
of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces
at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters
of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent
punishment. '35 8 The Court thus defined public discourse not merely
in terms of the content of the speech at issue, but also in terms of the
manner in which that speech was disseminated. The basic idea was
that speech must be communicated "publicly" in order to qualify as
public discourse.
This focus on the manner of dissemination is plainly discernible
in the Falwell opinion, which refers to "the area of public debate
about public figures. '35 9 Although the second use of the adjective
"public" in this phrase refers to the content of speech, its first use
concerns instead the manner in which speech is communicated. It
points toward a "genre" in which speech is distributed in such a way
as to be understood as "public" debate. Falwell refers again to this
genre in the prophylactic rule which it formulates at its conclusion.
Falwell explicitly confines the rule to recoveries for the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress "by reason of publications such
as the one here at issue. '360 The point, although never explicit, is
apparently that Flynt communicated his attack on Falwell in a public
way, rather than in a private letter or in a personal late-night tele-
phone call. The Court's formulation of the rule implies that if Flynt
were to convey the very same words as those in the Hustler parody
to Falwell in a private manner, they might not be included within the
domain of public discourse, and might not receive the same degree of
constitutional protection. The Court's citation of Justice Harlan's
3s7 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
358 Id. at r01-02 (footnote omitted).
359 Falwell, io8 S. Ct. at 88i.
360 Id. at 882.
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carefully phrased conclusion in Street v. New York strengthens this
implication: "'It is firmly settled that . . . the public expression of
ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves
offensive to some of their hearers.' 361
The boundaries of public discourse, therefore, are to some extent
dependent upon the ways in which speech is disseminated. Although
the judgment that speech is being communicated in a "public" manner
ultimately depends upon the particular context of a specific commu-
nicative act, at least three generic factors have influenced the Court's
approach to this question: the intent of the speaker, the size of the
speaker's audience, and the identity of that audience. The Court's
sensitivity to the intent of a speaker that her speech form part of
public discourse362 manifests itself in the Court's image of "the lonely
pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph." 363 Even if
that pamphleteer manages to distribute her message to only a very
few people, the Court will nevertheless consider her efforts as part of
"the flow of information to the public. '364 The reason cannot be that
the pamphleteer's message has in fact been received by the large
number of people who constitute the public. It must instead be that
when a speaker disseminates messages "at large" in this way, it sig-
nifies that she intends her speech to be widely distributed and to form
part of public debate.
The Court has sometimes been influenced in these matters by a
rather special concept of intention, which does not turn on the actual
purposes or motivations of any specific person, but rather on the
generic intent attributable to a particular form of communication. The
very act of distributing pamphlets on the street carries with it, so to
speak, its own presumptive intent. This notion of generic intent
appears in Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Dun & Bradstreet,365
which concludes that a credit report is not within the domain of public
discourse in part because the report is "solely in the individual interest
of the speaker and its specific business audience," and is "solely mo-
tivated by the desire for profit. '366 Justice Powell's evaluation of
motivation does not turn on the actual state of mind of the Dun &
Bradstreet employees who wrote the credit report, an issue upon
which no evidence appeared in the record. It is rather a generic
attribution of intent to a particular genre of speech. Justice Powell's
reasoning can thus be understood as pointing toward a general legal
conclusion that commercial credit reports are written primarily for the
361 Id. (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (x969)).
362 See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426-31 (978).
363 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
364 Id. at 705.
36' 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality opinion).
366 Id. at 762.
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purpose of profit, and that this purpose counts against their classifi-
cation as public discourse.
The Court's use of this concept of generic intent is also evident in
Miller v. California,367 in which the Court excluded obscene speech
from the domain of public discourse, in part because obscene speech
portrays "hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the
ensuing commercial gain."368 The Court's attribution of intention to
the generic category of obscene speech could not possibly have con-
stituted an empirical description of the particular motivations of in-
dividual writers or film-makers. It must instead be interpreted as an
ascriptive attribution of a specific social purpose to an entire genre of
speech. The Court explicitly contrasted this purpose to the one it
deemed appropriate to public discourse, the intent to bring "'about
...political and social changes desired by the people."'' 369
A second factor relevant to the determination of whether speech
has been disseminated in a public manner relates to the size of its
audience. The importance of this factor arises from the social foun-
dations of public discourse. Widely distributed speech itself becomes
a shared stimulus of the kind necessary for the creation of public
discourse; thus the "emergence of the mass media and of the 'public'
are mutually constructive developments. "370 If speech about well-
known matters deepens public experience, widely distributed speech
makes even heretofore secret matters well-known, and thus extends
the range of public experience. The same potential for impoverishing
public discourse inheres in censorship of either kind of speech.
This fact, together with the concept of generic intent, can perhaps
shed some light on the difficulties faced by the Court on the question
of whether constitutionally to distinguish between media and non-
media defendants. 371 Speech disseminated through the mass media is
by definition widely distributed, and hence is singularly "public-gen-
erating."37 2 The generic intent attributable to such speech, moreover,
is at least presumptively that of desiring to contribute to public de-
bate. 37 3 Thus media speech, simply by virtue of the manner of its
367 413 U.S. 15 (i973).
368 Id. at 34-35.
369 Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (I966)). The common law tort of
invasion of privacy contains a similar tension between the intent associated with commercial
enterprise and the intent associated with public discourse. See Tellado v. Time-Life Books,
Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904 (D.N.J. I986).
370 A. GOULDNER, supra note i81, at 95.
371 For two recent accounts of these difficulties, see Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and
Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J.
I519, 1561-64 (1987); Pownell, Defamation and the Nonmedia Speaker, 41 FED. COMM. L.J.
195, 210-I5 (1989).
372 See A. GOULDNER, supra note 18I, at io6.
373 For a clear example of how this presumption operates in the common law, see Arrington
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distribution, presents a strong prima facie claim to be classified as
public discourse. 374 Of course this claim is defeasible; obscene speech,
for example, can be distributed through, the mass media. But the
existence and strength of the claim makes the exclusion of media
speech from public discourse difficult and controversial.
Media speech is thus unique because it carries within it this prima
facie claim to constitute public discourse, a claim based entirely on
the manner of its distribution rather than on its content. This sin-
gularity explains the Court's continual attraction to a distinction be-
tween media and nonmedia defendants. 375 But on close inspection
the uniqueness of media speech lies only in the particular way in
which it grounds its claim to be public discourse, a claim whose
substance it shares with many other kinds of communication. Five
members of the Court can therefore state, without internal contradic-
tion, that "the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no
less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged
in the same activities. '376
A third factor that has influenced the Court in determining whether
speech has been disseminated in a public manner is the identity of
the audience to whom the speech is addressed. Speech that is widely
distributed is assumed to be addressed to the public. The same as-
sumption applies to speech that is actually communicated to only a
few people, so long as it is distributed to strangers "at large." The
question of audience arises, therefore, only in those cases where speech
is specifically addressed to a few designated persons. In such a con-
text, the Court has implied that the very same speech can be
public discourse when communicated to one audience, but be consti-
tutionally unprotected if communicated to another.377 Even speech
"communicate[d] privately"378 to one person can be public discourse,
if that person is, for example, a government official, 379 rather than
someone merely in contractual privity with the speaker. 380
3. The Failure of Contemporary Doctrine. - The failure of con-
temporary doctrine, then, stems from two distinct causes. First, the
v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983).
374 For examples of judicial recognition of the strength of this claim, see Denny v. Mertz,
io6 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d I4I, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (x983); and Harley-Davidson
Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 366, 568 P.2d 1359, 1362-63 (977).
375 See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986); Smolla,
supra note 371, at 1564.
376 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); see also id. at 773 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
377 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.8 (x983).
378 See id. at 146.
379 See id.; Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979).
380 Cf. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762 (plurality opinion) (declining to extend first
amendment protection to a credit report).
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criterion of "public concern" lacks internal coherence. Second, the
importance ascribed by the Court to the circumstances surrounding
the dissemination of speech exerts extraordinary pressure toward spe-
cific, contextual judgment. Even if the "public concern" test could be
given coherent and definitive meaning, the classification of speech as
public discourse would nevertheless depend upon a wide array of
particular variables inherent in specific communicative contexts. Thus
notwithstanding the importance of the normative and descriptive con-
cepts of public concern, the complex contextualizing force of circum-
stances will sometimes exclude from public discourse even speech
whose content plainly pertains to democratic self-governance and well-
known persons.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,381 in which the defendant publicly
called a city marshal a "damned Fascist" and a "racketeer," provides
an extreme example of this phenomenon. The specific context of the
defendant's speech convinced the Court that the communication at
issue was a species of "'personal abuse"' rather than public discourse,
and that it therefore enjoyed no constitutional protection. 382 Chaplin-
sky is remarkable precisely because the subject of the defendant's
speech was the official conduct of a public officer, a fact that would
ordinarily qualify speech prima facie as public discourse. Chaplinsky
illustrates, therefore, the powerful force of circumstances in the clas-
sification of speech. The same point might be made hypothetically by
imagining what would happen if Flynt had privately mailed the Cam-
pari parody to Falwell's mother, or had telephoned Falwell in the
middle of the night to read him the words of the parody. In such
circumstances no court would classify the speech as public discourse,
notwithstanding the unchanged content of Flynt's communication.
The many factors relevant to the classification of speech as public
discourse thus resist expression in the form of clear, uniform, and
helpful doctrinal rules. The Court's efforts to fashion simple doctrinal
tests is no doubt due to the imperative of articulating crisp and
predictable constitutional guidelines so that speakers will not face a
margin of legal uncertainty that might induce self-censorship. It is
consequently all the more remarkable that the Court's doctrine should
be so demonstrably overwhelmed by the pressure of contextualization.
Because of this pressure the Court's attempt to explain what it actually
means to inquire whether speech involves "'matters of public concern'
has collapsed into the conclusion that the inquiry "'must be determined
by [the expression's] content, form, and context . . . as revealed by
the whole record.'"383
381 31S U.S. 568 (1942).
382 See id. at 572 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)).
383 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (plurality opinion) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S 138, 147-48 (1983)).
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B. An Alternative Conception of the Domain of Public Discourse
The underlying cause of this pressure toward contextualization
becomes clear when we recall that the first amendment establishes a
distinct domain of public discourse in order to implement our common
belief in such values as neutrality, diversity, and individualism. 384 It
follows that the domain of public discourse will extend only so far as
these values override other competing commitments, such as those
entailed in the dignity of the socially situated self,38 5 in the importance
of group identity, 386 or in the necessary exercise of community au-
thority.387 The boundaries of the domain of public discourse are
located precisely where the tension between these competing sets of
values is most intense, and where some accommodation must conse-
quently be negotiated.
The boundaries of public discourse thus define the relative prior-
ities of our national values. They mark the point at which our com-
mitments shift from one set of goals to another. In locating these
boundaries we use the Constitution to facilitate social conditions that
reflect the hierarchy of our values, and in this way exercise "our
capacity for human self-constituting. '388 Because our values do not
come to us in the abstract, but rather through the critical apprehension
of our cultural inheritance, this process of self-constituting is also a
process of self-discovery. For this reason "how we are able to consti-
tute ourselves is profoundly tied to how we are already constituted by
our own distinctive history."389
Courts manifest their respect for this distinctive history when they
attempt to fix the boundaries of the domain of public discourse by
reference to the social norms that create for us the "genre" of public
discourse. These norms form part of our cultural inheritance; they
determine when we instinctively perceive speech as "public." The
common law tort of invasion of privacy, which looks to "the customs
and conventions of the community" in order to determine whether
speech is about matters "of legitimate public interest,"390 demonstrates
the power of these norms. Such customs and conventions, like all
community norms, are highly contextual. They have a "socially de-
384 See supra pp. 629-33.
385 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2609 (1989); id. at 2618 (White, J., dissenting);
Frisby v. Schultz, io8 S. Ct. 2495, 2502 (Ig88); Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757-61 (plurality
opinion).
386 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (952); Post, supra note 158, at 329-35.
387 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (I973) (authorizing the trier of fact in obscenity
cases to apply "contemporary community standards").
388 Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. x67, 168 (1987).
389 Id. at 169.
390 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment h (1977); see Virgil v. Time, Inc.,
527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (976).
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termined variability"391 which requires judgment to "take account of
what the situation requires, not what an abstraction demands." 392
Their perception and application require the exercise of what Georg
Simmel calls "moral tact."393
It is through the exercise of such "tact" that Justice Murphy in
Chaplinsky "knew" that the defendant in the case was engaged in a
private fracas rather than a public debate. 394 The norms interpreted
by this tact represent a tacit reconciliation of the competing demands
of public discourse and community life. The law can ignore them
only at the price of resolving conflicts of value through abstractions
cut off from the conventions that give meaning to everyday experience.
There are, however, three reasons why it is impossible to maintain
a pure fidelity to these norms. First, any such fidelity would require
the kind of extreme contextualization ordinarily associated with the
common law dignitary torts, 395 and such contextualization would con-
flict with the need for first amendment rules to be clear and predictable
in order to minimize self-censorship. Second, because the norms that
define public speech, like all social norms, are the product of a specific
community, and because different communities may have different
norms, a pure fidelity to "moral tact" would hegemonically establish
the dominance of the perspectives of a particular community. 396
Third, and most important, a pure methodology of moral tact conflicts
with the constitutional function of public discourse, which is to estab-
lish "a cleared and safe space" in which a common democratic will
may be forged. The application of social norms must thus continually
be examined in order to determine whether they actually serve this
function.397
The logic of democratic self-governance, however, cannot itself
provide an unqualified guide for doctrinal formulation. The norma-
tive concept of public concern lacks coherence precisely because all
speech is potentially relevant to democratic self-governance, and hence
391 E. GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 40 (1971); see Post, Foundations of Privacy, supra
note 72, at 968-74.
392 Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 445, 460 (1987)
(emphasis in original).
393 See G. SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 324 (K. Wolff trans. i95O).
394 Similarly, it is through the exercise of such tact that. the Court has elaborated the
"'common-sense' distinction" between commercial speech and public discourse. See Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
395 For a discussion of contextualization in the common law tort of invasion of privacy, see
Post, Foundations of Privacy, cited above in note 72, at 968-72, 979-85.
396 For an elaboration of this point in greater detail, see id. at 976-78.
397 The Warren and Brandeis article, cited above in note 342, illustrates how an unreflective
application of these norms can restrict public discourse in ways that are incompatible with the
full exercise of democratic self-governance.
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according to democratic logic all speech ought to be classified as public
discourse. 398 But this conclusion is unacceptable, for our commitment
to the values of public discourse does not automatically and always
override other competing commitments. The conclusion is also inter-
nally inconsistent, because the paradox of public discourse requires
that critical interaction must at some point be bounded. 399 Critical
interaction suspends the civility rules that make possible rational de-
liberation. Hence the very possibility of rational deliberation may be
endangered if the boundaries of critical interaction were to sweep too
extensively. An uncontrollable expansion of critical interaction threat-
ens to undermine the very purpose for which we establish public
discourse.
Sensitivity to this potential dynamic is evident in a decision like
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,400 in which the Court
permitted a school to censor "lewd speech" on the grounds that it was
"a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse"401 so as to
"'inculcate the habits and manners of civility.' 40 2 It is also apparent
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,40 3 in which the Court permitted the
FCC to enforce "contemporary community standards" to prohibit the
broadcasting of "'patently offensive' speech at "'times of the day when
there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.' ' 404
In reaching this conclusion the Court reasoned that "broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children" and hence could frustrate "the gov-
ernment's interest in the 'well-being of its youth"' 40 5 "and in supporting
'parents' claim to authority in their own household. "'406 In both cases,
therefore, the Court refused to expand the arena of critical interaction
in such a way as significantly to impair the processes by which com-
munities socialize the young and cause them to identify with com-
munity norms that the Court viewed as necessary for rational delib-
eration. 40 7
Thus just as the exercise of moral tact is by itself an insufficient
guide to the demarcation of the boundaries of public discourse, so
398 See supra pp. 669-72.
-99 See supra pp. 642-44.
400 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
401 Id. at 683.
402 Id. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 228 (1968)).
403 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
404 Id. at 731-32 (quoting In re Pacifica Found. Station, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975)).
405 Id. at 749 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968)).
406 Id. at 749 (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 (2968)); see Sable Communications, Inc.
v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836-37 (1989).
407 For a discussion of such processes, see Cahill, Children and Civility: Ceremonial Deviance
and the Acquisition of Ritual Competence, So Soc. PSYCHOLOGY Q. 312 (1987).
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also is the logic of democratic self-governance. In fact the placement
of these boundaries appears to require accommodation to three very
different kinds of concerns and judicial methodologies. The logic of
democratic self-governance presses toward solutions that maximize the
domain of public discourse. The paradox of public discourse requires
a social and functional analysis of the dynamic interrelationship be-
tween critical interaction and rational deliberation. And the need to
reconcile the values of public discourse with those of community life
exerts pressure toward specific and contextual judgments.
The real problem with contemporary doctrine is not that it fails
to attain some overarching reconciliation among these competing con-
siderations, for it is doubtful that such a reconciliation can be theo-
retically achieved, but rather that it fails to articulate with sufficient
clarity what is actually at stake in the definition of public discourse.
We need to establish a domain of public discourse that is amply
sufficient to the needs of democratic self-governance, but that is also
reasonably sensitive to competing value commitments, to the pre-
existing social norms that define the genre of public speech, and to
the social consequences implied by the paradox of public discourse.
Doctrinal formulation should assist courts in the evaluation of these
considerations, rather than masking them under wooden phrases and
tests.
Implicit in this conclusion is the startling proposition that the
boundaries of public discourse cannot be fixed in a neutral fashion.
From the perspective of the logic of democratic self-governance, any
restriction of the domain of public discourse must necessarily consti-
tute a forcible truncation of possible lines of democratic development.
Because this truncation must ultimately be determined by reference
to community values, the boundaries of a discourse defined by its
liberation from ideological conformity will themselves be defined by
reference to ideological presuppositions. 40 8 Fraser, Pacifica Founda-
tion, Chaplinsky, and Miller are all examples of such ideologically
determined boundaries to the domain of public discourse.
This kind of ideological regulation of speech is deeply distasteful,
and it is best that it remain so. Democratic self-governance could
easily be eviscerated if such regulation became the rule rather than
the exception. The ultimate fact of ideological regulation, however,
cannot be blinked. In the end, therefore, there can be no final account
of the boundaries of the domain of public discourse. 40 9 We can and
408 It is therefore no accident that the Court has been led to identify "classes of speech" that
"are no essential part of any exposition of ideas," the toleration of which "is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942).
409 In the words of the French political scientist Claude Lefort, "public space" in a democracy
"is always indeterminate." C. LEFORT, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL THEORY 4I (D. Macey
trans. 1988).
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do have firm convictions about the core of that domain, but its
periphery will remain both ideological and vague, subject to an endless
negotiation between democracy and community life.
V. CONCLUSION
Public discourse lies at the heart of democratic self-governance,
and its protection constitutes an important theme of first amendment
jurisprudence. This Article has traced the implications of that theme
for a single case, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, and has examined the
illumination that the theme can shed on some significant and trouble-
some aspects of first amendment doctrine. These include the protec-
tion of offensive speech, the distinction between fact and opinion, and
the use of motivation as a criterion for the regulation of speech. The
primary dynamic that underlies each of these doctrinal areas is the
separation of public discourse from the domination of civility rules
that define the identity of communities. The first amendment pre-
serves the independence of public discourse so that a democratic will
within a culturally heterogeneous state can emerge under conditions
of neutrality, and so that individuals can use the medium of public
discourse to persuade others to experiment in new forms of community
life. The ultimate dependence of public discourse upon community
life, however, suggests that this neutrality and freedom is always
limited, for the very boundaries of public discourse must be located
in a manner that is sensitive to ensuring the continued viability of the
community norms that inculcate the ideal of rational deliberation.
The paradoxical relationship between public discourse and com-
munity resembles the paradoxical relationship that public discourse
bears to state organizations structured so as to achieve explicit public
objectives. Within first amendment jurisprudence this second rela-
tionship is described by what has become known as public forum
doctrine.4 10 The doctrine recognizes that although democratic delib-
eration must occur through the medium of public discourse, the im-
plementation of public decisions requires the formation of organiza-
tions that will internally regulate speech in an instrumental manner
so as to achieve publicly determined results. 41' Schools could not
fulfill their institutional mission of educating the young unless they
were enabled instrumentally to regulate student speech; 412 the armed
forces could not fulfill their institutional mission of guarding the nation
unless they were enabled instrumentally to regulate the speech of
410 For a detailed discussion of the doctrine, see Post, cited above in note 138.
411 See id. at 1765-84.
412 See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, io8 S. Ct. 562, 567 (1988); Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, x89 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513 (i969).
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military personnel. 4 13 Although profoundly inconsistent with the crit-
ical freedom and neutrality that define public discourse, 414 this regu-
lation is required if democratic decisions reached through public dis-
course are to have any actual effect.
Public discourse may thus be conceived as situated in a triangular
space. In one corner is community, which regulates speech in the
interests of civility and dignity. In a second is organization, which
regulates speech in the interests of instrumentally attaining explicit
objectives. In a third corner is public discourse, which alone carries
within it the freedom of critical interaction that we, in our culturally
diverse nation, associate with democratic processes. The imperatives
of community life and of bureaucratic organization are powerful, and
perpetually encroach upon public discourse. Because public discourse
in fact depends upon both for its continued existence and effectiveness,
it is like the wind described by Herman Melville that "spins against
the way it drives."415
It is possible, of course, that the public discourse which is the
object of contemporary first amendment doctrine is a passing phenom-
enon. "[B]ureaucratic organization and instrumental rationality"4 16
may overwhelm public deliberation, and transform it into a largely
technical search for the most efficient ways of implementing explicit
and given objectives, such as national security. Or, mirabile dictu,
"the civic republican tradition"41 7 may actually give rise to "a universal
community"4 18 founded upon a "common commitment to a moral
understanding, '419 which will transform public discourse into the kind
413 See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (Ig8o) (upholding a regulation requiring
Air Force personnel to obtain prior approval before circulating petitions on Air Force bases).
414 This inconsistency was envisioned by Immanuel Kant:
Many affairs which are conducted in the interest of the community require a certain
mechanism through which some members of the community must passively conduct
themselves with an artificial unanimity, so that the government may direct them to public
ends, or at least prevent them from destroying those ends. Here argument is certainly
not allowed - one must obey. But so far as a part of the mechanism regards himself
at the same time as a member of the whole community or of a society of world citizens
... he can certainly argue without hurting the affairs for which he is in part responsible
as a passive member. Thus it would be ruinous for an officer in service to debate about
the suitability or utility of a command given to him by his superior; he must obey. But
the right to make remarks on errors in the military service and to lay them before the
public for judgment cannot equitably be refused him as a scholar.
I. KANT, What Is Enlightenment?, in FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS AND
WHAT Is ENLIGHTENMENT? 85, 87 (L. Beck trans. 1959). For further discussion, see Post,
cited above in note r38, at 1765-84.
415 H. MELVILLE, The Conflict of Convictions, in BATTLE PIECES AND ASPECTS OF THE
WAR 14, 17 (i960) (facsimile of 1866 ed.) (emphasis in original).
416 W. SULLIVAN, RECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 226 (1982); see also J. SCHAAR,
LEGITIMACY IN THE MODERN STATE 33-37 (i98I).
417 W. SULLIVAN, supra note 46, at i59.
418 Id. at 170.
419 Id. at 161. John Dewey, for example, viewed the public as but a prelude to the emergence
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of communal deliberation traditionally protected by the common law
privilege of fair comment.
Viewed from these perspectives, the vision of public discourse that
has guided first amendment doctrine since the 1930's may represent
merely a temporary phase of our national life, a momentary stay
against the heavy tides of order and morality. It is difficult indeed to
hold on to the radical negativity demanded by that vision. In the end
only time, and our ultimate convictions, will tell.
of "The Great Community." See J. DEWEY, supra note 184, at 211. Hence, Dewey envisioned
public discourse as bounded by the enforcement of civility rules. See supra p. 641.
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